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  Preface
The ambition to write someday a PhD slumbered for years while I was work-
ing at the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. 
When the opportunity eventually presented itself, the first of many challeng-
es to come was the angle of the research. The theme – the risks of homeown-
ership – was the starting point, but not very precise; not surprisingly it took 
some time to figure it all out.
This PhD thesis on ‘borrowers’ behaviour across countries’ was prompted 
by two observations: first, mortgage take-up amongst homeowners was fair-
ly divergent across Europe, and second, that this was seen by academic re-
searchers as well as policymakers and financial authorities as an indication of 
fundamental differences in the risk attitudes of homeowners. That conclusion 
seemed at odds with numerous (international comparative) studies, which in-
dicated, that the outcome on a macro level – in this case mortgage take-up – 
is not necessarily a good indicator of the underlying decision-making process. 
My research results support the latter view.
Six years later, time was up, meaning that the PhD had to be finished. It 
took a while to accept that fact; for the same reasons as formulated by Sid-
ney Weintraub in the early 1930s: “I continually hear things … which leaves me 
in a muddle, things that I recognize should come in, but which mean that I’ve got to 
change my own attack somewhat. But remind me that a doctorate hinges on finishing 
it. Refinements can come later. Yet, I don’t relish working when I’m not certain in my 
own mind.” (Cited by Weintraub, 2002). Therefore, even when this study is fin-
ished, I comfort myself with the thought that this thesis is not the end, just 
an intermediate phase, and a prelude to even more exciting things.
It is traditional in the preface to a PhD thesis to say a word of thanks to 
many people who have contributed over the years to the research. Many did 
– in one way or another – but most of them will remain anonymous. Here, I 
would just like to thank both my (co-)promoters (Peter Boelhouwer, Hugo Prie-
mus and Marja Elsinga), whose critical comments on earlier drafts improved 
the final version significantly. My wife, Corinne, who kept me grounded when 
I was euphoric and vice versa. Finally, my son Ernst, who retyped many tables 
when Gates’ brainchild broke down once again (any remaining errors are, of 
course, mine!).
Peter Neuteboom,
Monday, 7 July 2008
[ 1 ]
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 1 Comparing mortgage 
risks in a cross-country 
framework
“I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it 
in numbers you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you 
cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.” 
William Thomson, 1855 (cited in Porter, 1995)
 1.1 Introduction
Things were hectic on the housing and mortgage markets in the 1990s. Al-
though the time and depth of the cycles differed from one European country 
to another, by the end of the 1990s homeownership rates had risen and house 
prices had doubled in most countries (with some notable exceptions), while 
total outstanding mortgage debt had more than tripled (ECB, 2003). Overall, 
the influx of new households in the homeownership sector and the increase 
in the withdrawal of housing equity appeared to have made individual home-
owners and the financial sector more vulnerable to economic downturns.
These days, most Europeans are owner-occupiers (64%, Eurostat, 2006). In 
many countries, homeownership is promoted either directly or indirectly by 
the government via subsidies, high fiscal support and/or by phasing out sup-
port to the rented sector. The deregulation of the financial markets since the 
1980s has also pushed up homeownership rates. Homeownership is, however, 
inseparable from a minimum level of income security (Ford et al., 2002): the 
purchase of a home is by far the greatest financial commitment that most 
households ever acquire, while the monthly mortgage payments consume a 
major part of their net income. To many households, their home is the largest, 
if not the only, capital asset they possess. Deregulation of the national labour 
market and changes to the social security system in recent years – due to glo-
balisation and far-reaching integration in the European Union – have, however, 
weakened the links in the traditional triangle of homeownership, the labour 
market and the social security system. As a result, homeownership seems to 
be creating more risks for individual homeowners and society at large.
Meanwhile, even though the mechanisms of insecurity operate in the 
same way in different countries, the wide variation in mortgage take-up 
across Europe suggests that individual households (by their attitudes) and 
governments (by their policies) exert a strong influence. In recent decades, 
considerable comparative research has been conducted into the operations of 
the mortgage market in the EU and elsewhere (Diamond and Lea, 1992; Ball 
and Grille, 1997; Maclennan et al., 1999; Ball, 2003; European Mortgage Federa-
tion, 1995, 2003, 2005), which shows that the differences between countries 
are relatively large “due to differences in land law, tax law, consumer protection, the 
financial structure of the capital market and social-cultural differences” (Bartlett and 
Bramley, 1994, p. 8). This conclusion has been confirmed by more recent stud-
ies on mortgage take-up among owner-occupiers in Europe (ECB, 2003; Mercer 
[ 3 ]
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Oliver Wyman, 2003, 2005).
Often for the lack of anything better, these differences in mortgage take-
up between countries are viewed as indicators of the risks run by individual 
owner-occupiers, the financial sector and/or the economy as a whole. More 
implicitly, it is assumed that they reflect an underlying difference in the risk 
attitudes of owner-occupiers (e.g. ECB, 2003; BIS, 2006). The risk attitude of the 
more liberal Anglo-Saxon society (supposed to be ‘risk-taking’) is contrasted 
with the risk attitude of the continental welfare states (supposed to be ‘risk-
averse’).
However, there is very little systematic evidence to support this assump-
tion (Doling and Ford, 2003); the facts actually point in the opposite direction. 
This is illustrated in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1. Table 1.1 shows a number of fre-
quently used macro-indicators for mortgage take-up in nine European coun-
tries: the outstanding mortgage debt as a percentage of the gross national 
product and the estimated loan-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio and debt-
service ratio of average homeowners, i.e. including outright owners.
Although the ranking differs slightly for each indicator, three groups are 
clearly distinguishable: Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK make up the 
leading group (countries with a relatively high mortgage take-up), while Bel-
gium, France and Italy bring up the rear1. The other countries – Germany, Por-
tugal and Spain – fill in the middle positions. Note that although the loan-
to-income and loan-to-value ratio in Southern Europe are low, the preference 
of owner-occupiers in these countries for short-term mortgages, long fixed-
interest periods and rapid repayment plans means that the debt-service ratio 
1 The qualification ‘bringing up the rear’ is not a-prior negatively intended.
[ 4 ]
Table 1.1 Some indicators of mortgage take-up by all homeowners, absolute values and, in 
brackets, rank order (Europe, 2003)
Outstanding 
mortgage debt  
(% GNP)
Loan-to-income  
ratio
Loan-to-value  
ratio
Debt-service 
ratio
Belgium 28.5 (7) 1.42 (9) 0.54 (7) 0.10 (9)
Denmark 87.5 (2) 3.68 (4) 0.70 (5) 0.12 (8)
France 24.7 (8) 2.64 (6) 0.75 (3) 0.17 (5)
Germany 54.3 (4) 3.00 (5) 0.98 (1) 0.20 (2)
Italy 13.8 (9) 2.52 (8) 0.65 (6) 0.18 (3)
Netherlands 99.9 (1) 4.42 (3) 0.72 (4) 0.13 (7)
Portugal 50.6 (5) 4.75 (2) -- -- 0.23 (1)
Spain 42.1 (6) 4.79 (1) -- -- 0.18 (4)
UK 70.4 (3) 2.54 (7) 0.77 (2) 0.17 (6)
Source: European Central Bank, European Community Household Panel
Debt-service ratio is the ratio of net housing costs to net household income. Ranking order is based 
on high to low comparison.
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is relatively high. Figure 1.1 shows the counterbalance of mortgage take-up: 
the percentage of self-reported arrears2. Strikingly enough, the countries with 
the highest mortgage take-up also have the lowest percentage of arrears. In 
other words, the link between mortgage take-up and risk does not appear to 
be very strong.
This first, rather simple, research suggests a rather weak link between 
mortgage take-up and arrears; it seems therefore that one or more ‘unknown’ 
variables are influencing the outcome. Hence, it would be rash to draw con-
clusions about risks for individuals and society solely based on a number of 
output indicators such as the loan-to-income ratio or the outstanding mort-
gage debts in percentage of the gross national product. Clearly, the linkage 
between mortgage take-up and the underlying risk attitudes of borrowers is 
even less tough.
2 Risk can be enumerated in many ways, arrears are just one example.
[ 5 ]
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 1.2 Problem definition and research questions
Problem definition
What are the likely explanations for this apparently absent, direct link be-
tween mortgage take-up and risk for individuals and society? There are three 
possible candidates:
The institutional context is different in each country not just with regard to  ■
the much-quoted mortgage interest tax relief, but in a wide range of issues, 
such as consumer protection (e.g. procedures surrounding repossessions) 
and the level of social security (unemployment benefit, pensions, etc.).
The characteristics of individual owner-occupiers and borrowers differ  ■
considerably between countries (in terms of income, household composi-
tion, age, capital formation, etc.).
Finally, despite vigorous attempts to bring about European convergence,  ■
the mortgage markets are still national markets; so products and risk-as-
sessment procedures vary significantly across countries.
These factors – together with mortgage interest rates and developments in 
net income and property prices during the lifetime of the mortgage contract 
– exert a strong influence on the expected net costs and risks (ex-ante prob-
ability and impact) of taking out a mortgage to finance one’s own home, i.e. 
the risk profile of the mortgage in question. In other words, the risk profile of 
an identical mortgage contract for €100,000 will be different for Dutch and 
Italian homeowners. It may therefore be expected that although the chosen 
mortgage types vary between countries (e.g. in terms of amount and fixed-
interest period) the risks need not be all that different. This likewise applies 
to the underlying risk attitude of owner-occupiers in other EU-countries.
In short, one cannot definitively determine the costs – and, by extension, 
the risks (and risk attitudes) – that owner-occupiers have undertaken, based 
on a set of one-dimensional key figures (like the indices in Table 1.1). What is 
needed in order to draw up an adequate comparison of both the risks and the 
risk attitude of individual owner-occupiers is “to quantify the features of national 
systems in a consistent fashion” (Oxley, 2001). Without a common denominator, 
it is impossible to identify, compare or resolve the different risks. Therefore, if 
we are to draw any conclusions on the risks homeowners are apparently will-
ing to take, we should not concentrate on mortgage take-up as such, but on 
the net costs and risks it represents to the same homeowners.
Given the multiple nature of the risks and the complexity of the dynam-
ics, transforming mortgage take-up into the costs and risks of mortgages for 
owner-occupiers will be a complicated affair; certainly in a cross-country 
framework. This is the challenge at the core of this study. The central problem 
definition of this thesis is therefore: 
[ 6 ]
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How can the risk attitude of borrowers be measured consistently and compared in a 
cross-country framework?
Many have argued that housing risk is a complex and multifaceted phenom-
enon, involving many exogenous and endogenous factors, which are unevenly 
distributed and constantly changing (Lawson, 2005). One way to address the 
task at hand – comparing the risk attitudes of borrowers across Europe – is 
to analyse in detail the different factors that influence mortgage costs and 
which contribute to mortgage risks in different countries, thereby building 
on the already encyclopaedic knowledge of housing and mortgage markets 
across Europe. However, as this could easily create an information overload, a 
more ‘reductionist’ approach is far more appealing: “telling the whole story with 
just a small set of numbers” (Porter, 1995). Therefore, the general aim of compar-
ing the risks and risk attitudes of mortgages in a European perspective will be 
pursued within the context of a second aim, namely: to keep things compre-
hensible. This implies the use of just a small set of indicators to capture the 
differences and similarities between risks and risk attitudes across countries.
Hypothesis
If mortgage take-up across Europe varies against a background of different 
institutions etcetera, what can we expect of the underlying risk attitudes of 
owner-occupiers; i.e. how plausible is it to expect risk attitudes – at country 
level – to be different across Europe? Rational choice theory3 states that, un-
der equal circumstances, households will opt for the alternative that they 
perceive as offering the best (lowest) costs and risks. Under the preconditions 
of rational choice theory, borrowers maximise a utility function U , which may 
be defined as:
U = U(C,R:X) U 1C  < 0 U
1
R  < 0
where C denotes the expected costs over the full duration of the mortgage 
(in net present value terms), R the risk associated with that mortgage, while 
X is a set of factors reflecting household characteristics, economic condi-
tions, institutions and risk attitude. Both C and R depend on the mortgage 
contract specification (amortisation term, duration, fixed interest period etc.). 
All borrowers will maximise U over the different mortgage contracts available 
to them. If payment constraints matter, the borrower will minimise costs. If, 
however, payment constraints are not binding he will chooses for an option 
that minimise both costs and (a fraction) of the risks, depending on his risk 
3 Rational choice theory underpins much of economic theory today, but is well established within other social 
sciences as well (see Chapter 2 for a further elaboration).
[ 7 ]
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attitude.
If one assumes that households across Europe all have the same level of 
knowledge of, for instance, the relevant institutions in their own country, 
and are equally capable of estimating adequately the risks of homeowner-
ship4, then we cannot suppose a-priori that differences in mortgage take-up 
between countries point to differences of the underlying risk attitudes. That 
is, the utility maximisation for a borrower is conditional on X , i.e. on house-
hold characteristics, economic conditions, institutions and risk attitude. I.e. if 
mortgage choices are different between homogenous groups of households, 
this result may be merely a reflection of differences in the underlying insti-
tutional context, individual household characteristics and/or the structure of 
national mortgage markets altering the best mortgage contract for a home-
owner.
This thesis will test the following hypotheses:
Households behave rational when choosing a specific mortgage type; i.e. they I. 
choose a mortgage that constitute, for them, the lowest costs and/or risks.
The risk attitude of owner-occupiers with similar individual characteristics is iden-II. 
tical across countries when adjusted for differences in institutions and the struc-
ture of national mortgage markets.
The first hypothesis follows directly from rational choice theory. The second 
hypothesis can be interpreted two-folded5. In the weak version of the hypoth-
esis, the expectation is that all households in the different countries are re-
vealing a risk-averse attitude towards mortgage debt, as one may expect given 
the high financial commitment at stake. In a stronger version of the hypoth-
esis, no significant differences in the risk attitude of owner-occupiers with 
similar individual characteristics are expected between countries (i.e. when 
comparing homogeneous groups of households).
The research in this thesis concentrates on differences in mortgage risks 
and risk attitudes between countries. Although I do not expect risk attitudes 
to vary between countries, this is not to say that attitudes cannot and will not 
differ within a country; individual differences in knowledge, perception and 
attitude are real, but they lapse at a more aggregated level.
Research questions
The above discussion raises five research questions:
First how, and to what extent, does mortgage take-up vary in Europe, and 1. 
4 That is not to say that households have perfect/full knowledge of all the risks. “Economic agents do not have 
unlimited information-processing capabilities. It is eminently ‘rational’ for people to adopt rules of thumb as a way to 
economize on cognitive faculties” (Mullainathen and Thaler, 2000, p. 4). The point being argued here is that house-
holds in one country are not generally better informed than households in other countries.
5 Implicit in this hypothesis is, of course, the premise that borrowers choose rational (optimal).
[ 8 ]
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to what extent does the relevant context within Europe diverge?
Thereafter the more theoretical/methodological questions:
How can the expected costs and risks of a mortgage be quantified for an 2. 
owner-occupier? And
How can this framework be extended to compare the risk attitude of bor-3. 
rowers across countries?
Then, zooming in on the empirical results:
Do households, on average, choose the optimal mortgage, i.e. act rationally?4. 
To what extent does the risk attitude of homogeneous groups of owner-5. 
occupiers differ between countries within Europe?
I will discuss these research questions briefly.
Question 1. A more comprehensive insight needs to be gained into mortgage 
take-up across Europe, both at macro and micro level. Secondly, the three 
factors identified before, which can explain differences in mortgage take-
up across countries as well as influencing the costs and risks of a mortgage 
should be analysed. In this thesis, a more descriptive analysis will be under-
taken in order to analyse the most important features of mortgage take-up 
and the relevant context.
Question 2. I shall address this question with a stochastic model in which 
household income, house prices, inflation, interest rates and so on are rep-
resented by a set of stochastic differential equations. In the model the char-
acteristics of individual households and the mortgage are combined with a 
number of aspects from the institutional context. By generating different sce-
narios for future developments in, for example, house prices, household in-
come and so on, the model makes it possible to calculate the net mortgage 
payments, i.e. the net present value of the annual net mortgage payments 
over the full term of the mortgage for individual homeowners and at a more 
aggregate level. So, each scenario is supplemented with an outcome. Hence, 
the net mortgage payments are no longer characterised only by a single, most 
probable result, but by a probability distribution of all possible results. The 
average of this distribution is an indication of the expected costs of the mort-
gage, based on different scenarios; the variation in the results can then serve 
as the basis for risk determination (Trigeorgis, 1996). This framework can also 
be applied to different countries and hence different institutional contexts, 
making it possible to measure the extent to which net costs are influenced by 
the institutional context.
The model also provides information about the future debt-service ratio, 
i.e. the ratio of net mortgage payments to net household income. This debt-
service ratio can then be used as a trigger for two specific mortgage risks: ar-
rears and repossessions. In other words, a debt-service ratio that rises above a 
certain time-dependent level may lead to payment arrears, which, if they per-
sist for a longer period, will ultimately lead to repossession. The model allows 
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us to calculate the ex-ante probability of these risks.
Question 3. Previously assessed ex-ante costs and risks are not sufficient for a 
proper comparison of the risk attitude of owner-occupiers in different coun-
tries. Rational choice theory teaches us that households, under identical cir-
cumstances, will opt for the alternative that they see as the best deal in terms 
of costs and returns. If there is any uncertainty in the decision as regards, for 
example, the future costs or risks of a mortgage, then there is no unequivo-
cal choice; the optimum shifts depending on the risk attitude of the decision-
maker. Therefore, to measure the risk attitude of owner-occupiers, it is neces-
sary to consider how the costs and risks (see discussion of research question 
2) of their actual choice relate to the costs and risks of all the alternatives 
available to them within the same institutional context. Then it is possible 
to see whether the actual choice is optimal and/or the extent to which the 
owner-occupier chooses an option (i.e. a specific mortgage contract) with a 
low or high-risk profile. The risk attitude thus measured can then be easily 
compared in an international framework; the corrections needed for differ-
ences in institutions, household characteristics and supply-side limitations 
have already been discounted in the calculation of the costs and risks, which 
serve as the basis for deriving the actual risk attitude.
Questions 4/5. In short, do the hypotheses stipulated earlier hold true? If so, 
what are the implications for scientists and policymakers? In addition, if not, 
what could account for the differences in risk attitudes?
 1.3 Scientific and societal contribution
Scientific contribution
Very few comparative international studies have been carried out in this field 
to date. Those which have been conducted (see the references above, amongst 
others) are often descriptive in nature and make a wavering attempt to up-
scale the analysis by comparing a number of key figures between countries, 
studies which Oxley (ibid.) calls ‘low-level comparative’. Any explicit atten-
tion devoted by such studies to the risk of financing one’s own home with a 
mortgage, often consists of an ex-post approach which focuses on scope and/
or (social) consequences and remedies for households with payment (and/or 
repossession) problems; see for instance Ford et al. (2002) or Kempson et al. 
(2005).
In a more methodological sense a link is sought with stochastic modelling 
as applied in mainstream finance theory. Two such studies are important here: 
Yang et al. (1998) and Campbell and Cocco (2003). Both construct stochastic 
models to illustrate the costs and/or default risks of mortgages and both are 
crafted on the American context. The model of Yang et al. is a simple model 
for determining the ex-ante probabilities of mortgage default. The model of 
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Campbell and Cocco is far more elaborate – addressing, amongst other things, 
income changes at a micro level – but the analysis is limited to determining 
the expected costs of a mortgage (in the US).
My study differs in a number of respects from the studies quoted above. 
First, it embodies an international comparison, not of markets and agents, 
but of the expected net costs and the implied risks of a mortgage for an own-
er-occupier, while taking account of the institutional differences (to quote 
Oxley, ‘high level comparative’). Secondly, it is an ex-ante approach, which is 
designed to offer more insight into the underlying risk behaviour, i.e. the risk 
attitude of owner-occupiers6. Thirdly, it is an analysis at intermediate level, 
which compares sub-categories (e.g. borrowers, recent buyers, first-time buy-
ers, different age categories) in the housing market from an international per-
spective rather than just the national averages.
Finally, this study focuses on the quantification of risks and risk attitudes. 
Naturally, this implies an emphasis on the financial risk for owner-occupiers, 
but that is not to say that expected negative social consequences do not mat-
ter; they do – certainly for the individuals concerned. The question is whether 
these issues shape the risk attitudes of individual homeowners; here I as-
sume that they do not7.
Societal contribution
The financial authorities in the EU follow developments on the housing and 
mortgage markets closely. The outstanding mortgage debt at micro level, but 
also at macro level, is so large that developments in the housing and mort-
gage market have direct repercussions on the economy as a whole8. Some-
times in a positive sense; for example, at the end of the 1990s, economic 
growth in the Netherlands was strongly driven by rising consumer spending, 
which was partly influenced by equity growth (DNB, 2002). However, a nega-
tive spiral is equally conceivable. See, for instance the present Credit Crisis; 
here, the housing and mortgage market turbulence in the US has led to a 
slowdown of the economy9 (IMF, 2008). At present, financial authorities have 
to rely on simple macro indicators (like presented in Table 1.1) to monitor 
developments on the (international) mortgage markets. Then, the high loan-
to-value ratios in for instance the Netherlands, worry them, fuelling fear for 
6 Obviously, given the aim of the study, the starting point is the view of individual homeowners, neither the 
‘mortgage industry’ nor the government. However, the implications of the risk attitudes of individual homeowners 
are of importance to both the industry and the government.
7 This issue will be further addressed in Chapter 2.
8 Following the introduction of the euro, the economies of European countries have become more intertwined, 
also in a monetary sense.
9 Although lenders are eager to alter the causal relation; in their view, the slowdown of the economy (recession) 
is the main cause of the problems on the US housing market and not their lending behaviour.
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similar developments in the Netherlands as happening nowadays in the US. 
However, the likelihood of a downturn of Dutch housing and mortgage mar-
kets depends on more factors that can be grasped by a simple comparison 
of some output indicators (see discussion in Section 1.2). More insight into 
the actual ex-ante risks of outstanding mortgages is needed; the model devel-
oped in this thesis could contribute to this.
Although the model developed in this study is used to compare the net 
costs and implied risks of mortgage financing by owner-occupiers in a Euro-
pean perspective, it may also be used for other purposes. First, in a more pre-
scriptive sense, it could be used to determine the optimal mortgage in terms 
of scope and characteristics for individual owner-occupiers, given the house-
hold characteristics and the institutional context (checklist of what to choose 
and what to avoid). Secondly, it can help to estimate the risks in a lender’s 
mortgage portfolio, an area that has gained in importance since the imple-
mentation of Basel II.
 1.4 Structure of the thesis
In broad terms, the contents of this thesis follow the five research questions 
formulated in Section 1.2. Chapter 2 expatiates on the theoretical background 
of risk and risk measurement and leads to a conceptual model that forms 
the basis for modelling the cost and risk of a mortgage, and subsequently to 
derive the risk attitude. The description of the context is the central issue in 
Chapter 3, which analyses the differences and similarities in mortgage take-
up in the various countries (at macro and micro level) and the incidence of 
mortgage arrears and repossessions in Europe. Next, the characteristics of 
owner-occupiers and institutions are discussed. Finally, this chapter homes 
in on the structure of the mortgage market, specifically the product variation 
and borrowers’ accessibility. Chapter 4 transforms the conceptual model into 
a simulation model in which the mortgage costs and risks can be comput-
ed for owner-occupiers. A comprehensive description and the results of the 
model, i.e. the costs and risks in the various countries, are discussed. Chapter 
5 develops the model further to measure the risk attitude of households; the 
method, the results and the robustness of the results are discussed. Finally, 
Chapter 6 summarises and discusses the – policy and scientific – implications 
of the findings of this study.
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 2 On the quantification of 
mortgage risks
“Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything 
can be a risk, it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event. As 
Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a category of the understanding; it can-
not be given in sensibility or intuition.” François Ewald, 1991, p. 199.
 2.1 Introduction
Increasingly, we are preoccupied with risk management (avoidance) at indi-
vidual level and risk redistribution at societal level (Beck, 1992). Beck’s risk so-
ciety thesis claims that modern social and economic relationships are more 
susceptible than ever before to uncertainty, flexibility, and change, and hence 
are more likely to have negative repercussions on individuals and society.
The issue of risks, whatever their nature, can only be addressed within a 
framework which enables us to quantify those risks in a manner acceptable 
to all (or the vast majority). If not, neither communication nor design strat-
egies to handle these risks will be feasible. Therefore, quantification is not 
merely an (academic) exercise, but a social technology as well (Porter, 1995); it 
is primarily an attempt to create objectivity, to offer an alternative for subjec-
tive (expert) opinions (Croft, 2001). Of course, one can use numbers just as an 
illustration, but in science and for the broader public, quantification stands 
for thoroughness and clarity.
This chapter deals with three issues. First, it addresses the concepts of 
‘risk’ and ‘risk attitude’, all vital issues in this study (Section 2.2). Next, in Sec-
tion 2.3, the theoretical and empirical literature on mortgage risks is reviewed 
briefly with the aim of identifying the main drivers of those risks. Finally, 
some basic, non-technical issues, concerning mortgage risk modelling are 
discussed, finishing off with an outline of the conceptual model that lies at 
the basis of the mortgage risk quantification used in this thesis (Section 2.4).
 2.2 Conceptualising mortgage risks
The terms ‘risk’ and ‘risk attitude’ were somewhat loosely applied in the 
opening chapter. This section takes a closer look at both concepts and zooms 
finally in on the relevant mortgage risks taken into account in this study.
Definition of risk
What do we mean when we use the term ‘risk’? Usually, this question is an-
swered with a formal definition in which topics like probability, uncertainty, 
danger, peril, loss etc. all play an important role. A frequently used definition 
is “.. a numerical measure of the expected harm or loss associated with an adverse 
event” (Adams, 1995, quoting the Royal Society). Two things are crucial in this 
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definition: it is about (1) the quantification of (2) some possible negative con-
sequence (“harm or loss”). This concept of risk is far apart from notions of 
uncertainty and hazard, although these latter concepts are – in usage – seen 
as exchangeable. Uncertainty refers to uncertain outcomes, either positive or 
negative, while hazard refers to the actual source of danger.
It follows from the definition that risks are, by nature, both calculable and 
collective (Ewald, 1991). A possible event may only be considered a risk, if it 
can be expressed in terms of probability. Whether this probability is objective 
or subjective is irrelevant. If we have no knowledge or idea of the possibility 
of a specific event or its consequences, we do not use the word ‘risk’. Secondly, 
risks are collective. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as an individual 
risk. A risk implies membership of a group. Admittedly, if the risk materialises 
in the form of, say, an accident or payment difficulties, it manifests itself first 
and foremost at an individual level, but that does not alter the fact that the 
probability is determined at a higher, more collective level.
The question – What do we mean by risk? – was answered above with a rou-
tine definition, but that is not the end of the story. What people see as a risk 
may not necessarily be imminent. For example, many people consider nuclear 
energy as a major risk10. Some belief air travel as a risk, while few seem to 
worry about the safety aspects of car transport. What is considered a risk in 
real life is determined at an individual level, but it is also fixed in time and 
place. Moreover, this does not apply only to individuals but also to society at 
large (Porter, 1995, see also the quotation at the beginning of the chapter).
People differ not only in their perception of risks but also in the way, they 
assess them. The institutional, historical and political context and the (domi-
nant) ideology are all important factors in this process (Douglas and Wil-
davsky, 1982). For a long time, the debate was dominated by two diametrically 
opposed approaches: the quantification of objectively observable, calculable 
risks as opposed to the quantification/description of subjectively perceived 
potential risks. Both approaches gained followers in the course of time; it 
comes as no surprise that the first theory is favoured and applied in technol-
ogy and economics, while the second has been embraced by the other social 
sciences. The intrinsic difference would be irrelevant if the outcomes were 
more or less the same; but research has shown time and again that this is 
not the case. What emerges is something of a psychometric paradigm: “… per-
ceived risk ... can be distorted by numerous factors, including faulty memory, strong 
prior beliefs, inability to think probabilistically, and the manner in which risk infor-
mation is expressed and communicated to the public” (Jasanoff, 1998, p. 92).
10 However, people and society differ even on this subject: while Sweden was abandoning its nuclear plants, pay-
ing investors billions in compensation, Finland decided to invest billions in building new plants. Both decisions 
were based on the same information/knowledge, but apparently, with different assessments.
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As is often the case, thesis and antithesis are followed by synthesis; this 
time, in the form of the discursive approach (Jasanoff, 1998), which attempts 
to find a way of uniting the two polar models. Table 2.1 shows the main char-
acteristics of these models.
I shall now take a closer look at these stereotypes.
In what Jasanoff calls the realist approach, everything turns on “identifica-
tion of risk, mapping their causal factors, building predictive models of risk relations” 
(between cause and effect) and “expert scientific measurement and calculation...” 
(Lupton, 1999, p. 2) – in a nutshell, on measurement and risk determination. 
This approach implicitly assumes that all risks are quantifiable and that ra-
tional decision-makers decide accordingly. Obviously, an objective quantifi-
cation of a risk is not always straightforward or easy or beyond subjectivity 
(Croft, 2001). It assumes that experts are the only objective source of knowl-
edge when it comes to risks and implies that what they cannot identify as 
risks must not be seen as such – at least not at present. It also distinguishes 
clearly between risk assessment (the measurement of risks) and risk policy, 
which is seen as communication efforts by the government to convince indi-
viduals of the true nature of risks.
In this study, I follow a realist approach to risk. The ultimate goal here is, of 
course, to deduce risk and risk attitudes from the actual behaviour of house-
holds, i.e. the mortgage choices by owner-occupiers.
The second approach – the constructivist approach – is based on what in-
dividuals define or experience as a risk. It is culturally determined and heav-
ily dependent on place and time. Risk awareness and risk estimation and as-
sessment are not a constant but “… can be changed, magnified … or minimised 
within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly up to social definition and 
construction” (Adams, 1995, p. 181). Finally, a whole set of psychological factors 
at individual level determines how a household perceives potential risks and 
whether it can adequately assess the personal consequences. Society reaches 
agreement on risks and on how to cope with them individually and collec-
tively by means of broad participation by all the stakeholders.
The third and most recent approach – the discursive approach – tries to 
‘bridge’ the gap between the two former models. Central to this approach is 
the role of discourse in embedding the meaning of risk in society. Discourse 
is mobilised within a context of institutional arrangements; but at the same 
time, they help to structure and restructure it by creating particular under-
standings of meaning. Alternatively, in the best Foucaultian traditions this 
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Table 2.1 Three different models of risk perception
Policy prescription
Model Epistemology Source of authority Style Mechanism
Realist Realist Expert communities Managerial Expert advice
Constructivist Constructivist Social/interest groups Pluralist Public 
participation
Discursive Constructivist Professional discourses Critical Social movement
Source: Jasanoff (1998)
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process on deciding what the risks are, is merely “one of the heterogeneous gov-
ernmental strategies of disciplinary power by which populations and individuals are 
monitored and managed so as to best meet the goals of democratic humanism” (Lup-
ton, 1999).
Such a discourse, however, is not necessarily as negative – use or misuse 
by governments or other stakeholders – as the adherents of the discursive ap-
proach believe. It is no longer realistic in our complex modern society to ex-
pect each individual to have adequate knowledge of every kind of risk – all 
the way from nuclear energy to insurance decisions – let alone how to ad-
dress to them. Quantification by experts may prove useful here; not in a nor-
mative manner as the followers of Foucault expect, but in a more prescriptive 
way, where quantification is seen as a palette of options for decision-makers, 
showing the implications for individuals and society – in other words, as ad-
vice.
Definition of risk attitudes
Risks cannot be assessed in a vacuum; one does not run a risk unless it is 
counterbalanced by something (potentially) positive, such as the prospect of 
higher returns and/or lower costs. Usually, higher returns and/or lower costs 
go hand in hand with high(er) risks. “The option with the optimum mix of costs, 
benefit, and risk is selected. The risk associated with that option is acceptable. All 
others are unacceptable” (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981, p. 24). I.e. risk is never ac-
ceptable unconditionally; it becomes acceptable if some benefit can compen-
sate for the risk. Therefore, it is the decision yielding risk, which is acceptable, 
not the risk itself. The trade-off between risk and benefits differs amongst in-
dividuals and, some argue, on a societal level. It follows, that the risk attitude 
of an individual decision-maker is his preference for a specific option out of a 
set of alternatives with different risk/benefit tradeoffs (Fischoff et al., 1981).
Rational choice theory11 states that households, under equal circumstanc-
es, will opt for the deal that they perceive as offering the best costs/returns. 
If there is any uncertainty in this decision – with regard to, for example, the 
future costs and risks of a mortgage – then there is no clear-cut optimal 
choice; the optimum shifts and is dependent on the risk attitude of the deci-
sion-maker. A rational decision-maker will not a priori choose the option with 
the lowest costs, but will maximise utility: he will try to minimise the costs 
(or maximise the returns) plus a fraction of the risk (Eftekhari et al., 2000). To 
measure the risk attitude of owner-occupiers, it is therefore necessary to as-
certain how the costs and risks of the actual choice relate to the costs and 
risks of all the alternatives within a given institutional context, i.e. within a 
country. Only then is it possible to say whether the actual choice is optimal 
11 See Coleman (1995) and Hall (1990) for a more detailed explanation of the rational choice theory.
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and whether the owner-occupier has selected an option (mortgage) with a 
high or low risk profile.
In a standard rational choice model, the risk attitude is considered con-
stant – generally assuming a risk-averse or neutral decision-maker. The ques-
tion then becomes which alternative is best for the individual decision-maker, 
i.e. the option with minimum costs and risks. In this study, I do not assume 
a constant risk attitude; on the contrary, the exact assessment of the risk at-
titude is precisely the issue here, within a country, but the more so between 
countries. The central issue here is to compare the actual choice in terms of 
costs and associated risks – not in terms of mortgage take-up – with all alter-
native options.
Although the rational choice theory is a popular paradigm in economics, 
it has often been criticised for failing to give a realistic representation of the 
true world: household decision-making is far more complex than assumed by 
the theory (see, for instance, the seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman12). 
The dynamics of housing costs and household income makes an optimal 
mortgage choice a complex process; owner-occupiers need to make a (subjec-
tive) estimate of these factors. A host of research studies have demonstrated 
that they do not always behave equally rationally (see, for example, Shiller, 
1998). In short, owner-occupiers cannot always make the correct ‘rational’ 
judgment because they lack the information and the capability to properly 
assess the (potential) consequences of the various alternatives. In addition, 
most owner-occupiers get very little opportunity to learn from their mortgage 
choices, as they make them only once or a few times in their life. Reliance on 
tradition and the opinions of experts, often intermediaries with their own in-
terests to serve, is frequently the chosen way out.
In conclusion, rational choice theory may help to ‘rank’ the different op-
tions open to the owner-occupier. In the process, it will provide a framework 
for analysing choice behaviour, indicating whether a deviation from an ‘opti-
mum’ can be qualified as irrational, risk-averse or the like13.
Mortgage risks
Although homeownership can enhance the security of individual homeown-
ers and society as a whole, it can just as easily lead to insecurity if circum-
stances are more dejected. Risk-assessment procedures applied by lend-
ers ensure that, in the short term, the debt-service ratio will remain within 
limits; therefore, arrears are unlikely. As time passes, however, the probabil-
12 Their prospect theory, based on (experimental) psychology, shows vast and persistent deviation from rational 
behaviour (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
13 Note that this framework is more frequently applied to the opposite question of higher returns versus lower 
risks for financial assets; see Markowitz’s portfolio analysis (1952), introducing the now familiar mean-variance 
framework. The only difference is that the picture is canted; the analysis remains essentially the same.
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ity of unforeseen developments increases, as does the probability of arrears 
and eventual repossessions. Fluctuations in house prices can, for example, 
encumber households with serious negative equity. Economic transforma-
tion, especially after the deregulation of the labour market (more part-time 
and temporary jobs and self-employment), and demographic factors, such as 
higher rates of household dissolution and household instability, can spell in-
security for homeowners (and potential homeowners). These adverse events 
may lead to – as it is often called in the literature – to unsustainable home-
ownership. This can be described as a process in which the monthly housing 
costs become increasingly burdensome for the borrower to bear. In the first 
stage, household experiences the housing costs as a strain. Then when finan-
cial problems endure, they might fall into arrears and finally, they may face 
repossession (see for instance Maclennan et al., 1997; Ford and Burrows, 1999). 
Although, frequently used, this concept is rather ill defined; referring to, for 
instance, the social problems of mortgage arrears or to (financial) difficulties 
stemming from high housing costs for low income households. In this thesis, 
I used the concept of unsustainable homeownership simply to refer to the fi-
nancial commitments households had accepted when taking out a mortgage 
but which became unsustainable due to changing conditions underpinning 
the initial financial commitments. In Figure 2.1, this process is depicted.
The crucial factor in this process is the debt-service ratio, i.e. the mortgage 
costs to household income ratio. If an (unforeseen) adverse event drives up 
this ratio, the financial commitment may be unsustainable in the end, lead-
ing ultimately to arrears and repossession. In this study, I shall focus espe-
cially on the mortgage risks for individual homeowners. Give the ambition in 
this thesis to measure the risks attitudes of owner-occupiers, the emphasis 
lies naturally on the objectively observable mortgage risk: i.e. mortgage ar-
rears (default risk) and the repossession risk (and negative equity)14,15. In gen-
eral, default risk can be defined as the probability and impact (consequences) of 
a household’s inability to continue to meet the financial obligations that it assumed 
when he bought the property. This scenario may be brought about by an increase 
in the housing costs due to e.g. a higher interest rate or a drop in income (in 
connection with, say, unemeployment or divorce). However, not every change 
in the housing costs or the income automatically leads to a default risk. Many 
owner-occupiers have some sort of buffer to absorb any unexpected setbacks, 
especially if their income has risen in relation to their mortgage burden. 
Therefore, it is not a rise in the housing costs, as such, that matters but a rise 
14 14, In the literature, many synonyms are used for these types of risks: for instance, mortgage arrears, liquidity, 
default or credit risk and (early) prepayment, value, residual debt or equity risks.
15 <noot>15 Of course, other types of risks are noticeable as well, e.g. maintenance risks or the social costs of 
being repossessed. However, these risks do not come autonomous.
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above a certain hurdle level.
Of the second type of mortgage risk, repossession refers to the probabili-
ty that arrears are long lasting and homeownership becomes unsustainable while 
negative equity relegate to the impact (consequences) that the market value of the 
property is lower than the outstanding mortgage in a situation when the owner-occu-
pier is being repossessed. Developments in house prices are the greatest source 
of uncertainty for owner-occupiers when it comes to the capital that is ‘tied 
up’ in the house. In contrast with the default-risk situation, owner-occupiers 
can avoid negative equity risks by postponing the sale of the property (the 
likelihood depends, of course, on the prime reason for selling the house). In 
such cases, the negative equity is more ‘virtual’ than actual. Negative equity 
constitutes a genuine mortgage risk only if it coincides after a period of mort-
gage arrears leading to repossession; in this study, I focus solely on this com-
bination of events.
Finally, it is important to note that mortgage risks for individual house-
holds are also strongly determined by time and place. An unforeseen sharp 
rise in the debt-service ratio can plunge households straight into problems 
whereas a gradual rise gives them time to find a solution within their budg-
et or to move to a new home. That said, people who have been in debt for a 
while tend to slip gradually into payment problems (though the actual mo-
ment of truth can sometimes be delayed for years). The step from mortgage 
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arrears to repossession is certainly influenced by the institutional context: if 
the results of payment difficulties are serious and immediate, households will 
go to great lengths to avoid problems with the lender; in other cases payment 
difficulties develop more slowly and can last longer.
 2.3 Drivers of arrears
What are the drivers of mortgage arrears16? The literature offers two main 
theories to explain the frequency of arrears: the ability-to-pay theory and the 
equity theory of default. The first is based on the premise that “mortgagers re-
frain from loan default as long as income flows are sufficient to meet the periodic 
payment without undue financial burden” (Jackson and Kasterman, 1980; Wong 
et al., 2004). In other words, people do not end up in arrears voluntarily; when 
the housing costs are not in balance with the monthly income, households 
are ‘forced’ into arrears. The crucial factor here is the debt-service ratio: the 
net mortgage payments divided by net household income. If this ratio rises 
above a certain level, many individual households will face unsustainable 
homeownership (starting with experiencing housing costs as a heavy burden), 
which will increase the probability of arrears and eventually lead to reposses-
sion.
The alternative theory states that “borrowers base their default decision on a 
rational comparison of the financial costs and returns involved in continuing or termi-
nating mortgage payments” (ibid.). This means that owner-occupiers stop their 
mortgage payments if the actual value of their property falls below the out-
standing mortgage. The decisive factor in this scenario is not the debt-service 
ratio but the net equity embedded in the property. In contrast with the US, 
this approach is, however, not very useful in Europe (Muellbauer, 1997; Böheim 
and Taylor, 2000), mainly because it implies that the borrower’s liability ends 
when he hands over the title deeds to the lender. In Europe17, however, bor-
rowers remain liable for any remaining debt, though in most countries this 
is normally discharged after a few years (in most cases, personal bankruptcy 
laws restrict the term to 1-3 years). Given that households in the US do not 
usually go for the prepayment option either, even though this is, theoretically, 
the most rational course of action18 and given that, in Europe, the remaining 
16 Since the overwhelming majority of studies on ‘unsustainable homeownership’ are concerned with mortgage 
arrears, this necessarily implies that the literature review is restricted to that aspect (in Chapter 3 I provide infor-
mation on the other aspects).
17 In the US, no right of recourse exists for lenders, i.e. if the collateral is short on the outstanding debt; the 
losses are for the lender.
18 Amongst other things, social costs and the credit constraints imposed on a borrower with a bad credit history 
prompt households to keep paying their debt.
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debt is discharged after several years, there is not much difference in actual 
behaviour of households on either side of the Atlantic.
In the rest of this section, because of its relevancy in a European context, I 
shall concentrate on the origins of the insecurity that follows from the inabil-
ity-to-pay hypothesis.
The causes of unsustainable homeownership have been researched exten-
sively, especially in relation to arrears. There has been an interest in the caus-
es and consequences in Anglo-Saxon countries for a long time, but the growth 
in homeownership and the outstanding mortgage debt in continental Europe 
have sparked interest elsewhere as well. Most of the studies concentrate on 
developments in a specific country. I shall pause here to briefly review the lit-
erature on countries inside Europe.
It should be noted that the primary concern of this research is on the 
causes – the drivers – of mortgage arrears. Numerous studies have appeared 
which attempt to identify the characteristics of households in arrears, some 
even speculate on how they got there in the first place. These will be briefly 
addressed in the next chapter. Neither does this study attempt to explain the 
overall level of mortgage arrears over time or across countries. Variations over 
time are addressed, for instance, by Brookes et al. (1994) and more recently 
by Whitley et al. (2005) and Figuera et al. (2005); while the issue of cross-coun-
try variation is explained by Doling and Horsewood (2004) and Diaz-Serrano 
(2005). These studies identify income and income volatility as, by far, the 
most important variables in arrears over time (business cycle) and between 
countries.
As mentioned, the UK has a long tradition of research on the extent, causes 
and effects of unsustainable homeownership. Ford et al. (2002) conclude that 
unsustainable homeownership in the UK is no longer a problem that arises 
only in times of economic hardship; in fact, it is becoming more and more of 
a ‘fixture’: “… the current incidence of unsustainable homeownership is not ‘patho-
logical’ or short-lived but rather has become ‘normal’ and enduring” (p. 170). They 
offer four arguments to support this opinion:
the expansion of homeownership, especially among low-income groups; ■
demographic transformations, i.e. higher rates of household dissolution  ■
and instability;
economic transformations, particularly the deregulation of the labour mar- ■
ket with more part-time and temporary work and self-employment;
last but not least, the restructuring of the safety-net provisions, notably  ■
the restriction of income support for mortgage interest and the introduc-
tion of the private sector counterpart: mortgage payment protection insur-
ance.
The authors conclude on the basis of an analysis of the English Housing Sur-
vey 1995-1999 that roughly 60% of all payment problems are caused by loss of 
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income (due to e.g. redundancy on the labour market) and 30% by household 
changes (e.g. divorce). Only 10% are attributable to higher mortgage payments 
(due to higher interest rates). Kempson et al. (2004) reach similar conclusions, 
adding that many households tend to pin the blame for their payment prob-
lems on external factors. In many studies the scores are low for ‘over-com-
mitment’ and ‘overlooked or withheld’ (in the Kempson-study 9% and 11% re-
spectively), even though many budget studies have shown that quite a lot of 
people end up in difficulties because of poor financial planning. Often, mort-
gage arrears are not the only debts; many people are behind with payments 
for other obligations as well (e.g. energy bills).
Both studies point out that households do not always fall into arrears 
for one reason alone; usually, as time progresses, arrears develop through a 
combination of factors. The CML (2005), quoting the Citizens Advice Bureaux, 
states that 60% of all households in arrears felt that their debt was caused by 
multiple factors. These combinations of factors and the different time sched-
ules that accompany them create serious problems in any (quantitative) anal-
ysis.
Böheim and Taylor (2000) were the first to use panel data, i.e. the British 
Household Panel Survey, to explain arrears and repossessions (both in the 
rental and homeownership sector). The causes they identify are more or less 
the same as those identified in the studies discussed above, but they also 
highlight the role of personal factors (money mismanagement) and expecta-
tions. They draw attention to the fact that some households are permanently 
short of money, thereby concluding that financial problems in the past are the 
best indicator for financial problems in the future19; 60% of all households in 
arrears managed to escape their financial problems within the year, but only 
temporarily. Böheim and Taylor constructed an indicator for financial shocks, 
using both the expectations of individual households and actual develop-
ments; financial shocks emerged as a key route to unsustainable homeowner-
ship (more than income loss, taken on its own).
In other countries, research on the extent, causes and effects of unsus-
tainable homeownership is still in its infancy. Recent studies revealed that in 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, the main reasons for arrears are loss 
of income following unemployment and divorce (Bosvieux and Vorms, 2003; 
Kloth, 2004; Elsinga and Dol, 2003); an unanticipated increase of housing costs 
nor money management problems seems to be a major cause in these coun-
tries.
Interestingly, hardly any research of this type has been carried out in coun-
tries with relatively high levels of arrears (e.g. Italy, Belgium).
19 This is why, in any risk assessment procedure by lenders, past credit history plays the most important role, 
more than actual loan-to-income or loan-to-value ratios; these can be and are raised when necessary.
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A new approach was adopted by Neuteboom and Dol (2005), who re-
searched the causes of mortgage arrears by applying a duration analysis on 
longitudinal panel data (ECHP) from eight European countries over the period 
1994-2001. Neuteboom and Dol studied individual changes in income, hous-
ing costs etcetera and looked at whether these caused any future financial 
difficulties or arrears. The main results are set out in Table 2.2. The percent-
ages in Table 2.2 identified changes that took place at household level prior to 
the arrears.
As shown in Table 2.2, the main underlying reason is a fall in income and/
or a rise in housing costs (not due to moving house), followed by a change 
in socio-economic position (loss of job) and personal factors (payment disci-
pline, attitude, etc.). Mobility between the rental and the homeownership sec-
tor plays a somewhat insignificant role in most countries. Finally, it appears 
that, in some countries, personal factors (money mismanagement, attitudes) 
are an important cause of arrears as well (Denmark and the UK), while in oth-
ers (France and the Netherlands) paying discipline and attitude seem to be 
stricter. It should also be remembered that in 1994-2001 many countries in 
Europe were experiencing an economic boom, implying not only rather low 
levels of arrears but also lower probabilities of drops in income and rising in-
terest rates.
In conclusion, it seems that a complex mix of socio-economic and person-
al circumstances causes mortgage arrears. It has been suggested that three, 
possibly interrelated, sets of factors are at work here (Ford et al., 2002). The 
first concerns macro factors, such as interest rates, changes in government 
subsidies and social security systems. The maximum loan-to-income or loan-
to-value ratio also has a profound effect on risk. These factors are largely re-
sponsible for developments through time or between countries, i.e. the overall 
levels of default. What they do not explain is the variation in the incidence of 
arrears between individuals. The second set concerns income and expendi-
ture on a household level. Fluctuations in household income because of job 
loss or short-term work can lead to serious payment problems. A decline 
in the second income, if one of the partners starts to work fewer hours (for 
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Table 2.2 Causes of arrears (selected countries, in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Belgium 13.6 9.3 3.9 0.6 55.4 4.8 12.4
Denmark 17.8 10.9 13.2 2.6 38.2 1.6 15.7
France 15.9 9.1 7.8 2.8 56.2 2.9 5.3
Netherlands 14.7 22.4 3.5 2.2 42.0 9.8 5.3
UK 19.2 20.3 2.6 2.6 33.4 7.9 14.0
Source: Neuteboom and Dol (2005)
Columns (1) Work > benefit, (2) Higher housing costs, (3) Moving from rented sector, (4) Moving 
within owner-occupied sector, (5) Drop in income, (6) Family > single (parent), (7) Personal factors 
(money mismanagement, attitudes); the differences in the actual level of arrears is quite high, 
ranging from below 1% in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK to nearly 5% in Belgium (see Figure 
1.1).
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whatever reason), could also have repercussions, as mortgage obligations are 
being increasingly based on double earnings. Long-term illness and divorce 
also belong in the second set. Unanticipated costs, such as a rise in mortgage 
interest rates, can also increase the payment burden. Finally, the third set is 
more personal: people may have budgeting problems or specific attitudes, or 
they may set quite different spending priorities.
 2.4 Modelling mortgage risks
Section 2.2 defined the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘risk attitude’. The previous sec-
tion reviewed the potential sources of these risks (in terms of Section 2.2, haz-
ards). This section will combine them in one conceptual model, which will be 
interpreted in more econometric terms in Chapters 4 and 5 and will serve as 
the basis for answering the principal aim of this study, i.c. estimating the risk 
attitudes of borrowers.
To ascertain the risk – in this case the mortgage risk – we need answers to 
three questions (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981):
Which events (hazards) can have (potentially) negative consequences for  ■
individual homeowners?
What is the probability of such an event taking place? And finally, ■
What are the exact consequences? ■
In other words, risks are combinations of hazards, probabilities and impact 
(consequences) for individual owner-occupiers. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) 
present this as a triplet:
R = {< s,ps,xs >} 
s = 1. .S
In which s = 1. .S is the risk source, ps is the probability of an unexpected, 
unwelcome situation and xs is the impact, i.e. the negative financial conse-
quences.
This concept of quantification of risk as represented by Kaplan and Gar-
rick’s triplet can be illustrated by a simple example of measuring the af-
fordability of homeownership (see Box 2.1). How can this concept be used 
to measure mortgage risks? The answers to the above questions provide the 
guidelines.
Which event (hazards) can have (potentially) negative consequences for individual  ■
homeowners? Section 2.2 identified the hazards (s = 1. .S ) for the individual 
owner-occupier: amongst others, a change in household income, interest 
rates, inflation, and/or house prices.
What is the probability of such an event taking place? ■  If we assume that the 
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above hazards are historically determined and path-dependent, we can 
use their historical probability distributions to estimate possible future de-
velopments (ps).
What are the exact consequences?  ■ There are two crucial factors in this anal-
[ 25 ]
Box 2.1 Measuring the affordability of homeownership
Suppose we are interested in the affordability of homeownership. Let us 
assume that affordability is merely a function of interest rates, household 
income and outstanding mortgage debt. Hence:
Afft = Afft(r t, Yt, Mt−1)
Since interest rates are notoriously uncertain, so is affordability. It is easy to 
conceive a scenario in which interest rates rise, thereby pushing up housing 
costs and lowering affordability (Δr t Υ  0 ⇒  ΔAff t 
Υ
 0). So, it is easy 
to use the model to compute the consequences in terms of housing costs 
and affordability for a whole range of interest rates. In Kaplan and Garrick’s 
triplet representation, we already have the different scenarios s  and the 
consequences xs; all that is needed is an estimation of ps, the probability 
of a specific scenario. Of course, no one can say what lies ahead, but we can 
use historical data on the interest rate distribution as the closest proximity to 
any such an event happening in the future, i.e. ps*. The historical distribution 
of the interest rates is shown in the figure below left; the corresponding 
consequences are shown in the figure below right.
This is a simple, stylised example with just one independent variable (r t); 
in theory, it can easily be extended with numerous other variables. All that 
is needed is the definition of a series of scenario s  i.e. a combination of 
expected developments in the various relevant factors, an assessment of 
the possible consequences xs when scenario s  occurs and knowledge of the 
(joint) probability distribution of the different scenarios pt.
* Note, that if, for whatever reasons, some sort of structural break has occurred (or is to be expect-
ed), the historical distribution is not always the right choice; one should calibrate accordingly.
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ysis. Firstly, the expected costs under different conditions. Secondly, the 
debt-service ratio; if this ratio exceeds a certain level (hurdle rate), the re-
sult will eventually be arrears and/or repossession20 (xs). It is ultimately the 
combination of both that shapes consumer behaviour.
The above answers were used to design a model for measuring mortgage 
costs and risks. That model simulates scenarios of the underlying variables, 
namely: interest rates, house prices, household income, etc., over the relevant 
time horizon. Secondly, it computes (the discounted value of) the annual net 
mortgage costs and debt-service ratio21. The annual net costs and the debt-
service ratio are then no longer characterised by one – i.e. the most likely – 
outcome, but by a probability distribution of all possible outcomes. The mean 
can serve as an indication of the expected costs, while the variation in the 
results can serve as a basis for determining the risk. The development of the 
debt-service ratio over time can serve as a ‘trigger’ for the mortgage risks (ar-
rears and repossession).
It was mentioned in the introduction that any comparison of the costs and 
risks of mortgages should take account of the differences between the insti-
tutional contexts, the characteristics of individual owner-occupiers, and the 
fact that the mortgage markets are still national markets. Therefore, besides 
scenarios on future income, interest etcetera attention needs to be paid to 
institutions, household characteristics and supply (limitations). The decision-
maker, the borrower, has to decide which product delivers the lowest costs 
and risks over the full mortgage period in his own case. It is assumed that the 
decision-maker behaves rationally; in other words, ideally, he has full knowl-
edge and is able to use it to make a rational decision. This is summed up in 
Figure 2.2.
Note, that for (prospective) homeowners, the macro-factors – the uncer-
tainty about future developments – are more or less equal, but the conse-
quences may be different; for example, a change in interest rates will affect 
all homeowners, but to a different extent depending on the outstanding debt 
and the mortgage type. Life cycle and income changes are, in principal, based 
on the individual characteristics of a household, namely: income, education, 
and household type (size), etc.
In short, the decision-making process is influenced by a set of macro-vari-
ables and micro-variables; the actual choice depends on the homeowner’s as-
sessment of the costs and risks of the alternatives available to him.
Finally, how does this conceptual model fit in with the general aim of this 
study to capture the differences in risk attitudes – if any – between countries? 
20 Obviously, the pace at which all of this leads to payment difficulties is dependent on the context.
21 I.e. linking expected housing costs with net household income.
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As explained earlier, analysing the actual choice that households make with 
all other options ranked in order of risks will suffice. All the options should 
be framed in terms of costs and risk, corrected for differences in institutions, 
household characteristics and the supply side (restrictions). Therefore, the 
conceptual model to calculate the net costs and risks of a mortgage (depicted 
in Figure 2.2) can readily be applied.
[ 27 ]
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 3 Mortgage markets and 
mortgage take-up in 
Europe22
 3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was suggested – and to some extent demonstrated – that 
mortgage take-up across Europe varies widely at both micro and macro level. 
In other words, there are differences in the degree to which, and the way in 
which, individual households in the various countries use a mortgage to fi-
nance homeownership. It was also argued that a simple output indicator such 
as mortgage take-up says little about the actual risks facing owner-occupiers; 
primarily because national differences in the institutional context, the char-
acteristics of owner-occupiers and the national mortgage market are left out 
in such comparison; issues that are assumed to be of importance.
In this chapter, these assumptions are explored more deeply. After discuss-
ing mortgage take-up at micro and macro level (Section 3.2), I shall present 
the institutional differences across Europe with the aid of a financial regime 
index (Section 3.3) and then discuss the characteristics of owner-occupiers 
(Section 3.4) and structure of national mortgage markets (Section 3.5). The 
primary aim of this chapter is to provide some basic information that can of-
fer further insight into the similarities and differences in mortgage take-up 
and institutions and provide ample proof of the above assumptions. Second, 
it will assist in the interpretation of the empirical results in Chapters 5 and 6.
Interested readers will find an abundance of more detailed analyses on 
housing and finance markets in the literature; see, for instance: ECB (2003); 
Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003, 2005); consecutive studies of the European Mort-
gage Federation (2003a, 2005); Donner (2000) and Neuteboom (2002, 2004). For 
a more detailed analysis of the differences and similarities between demo-
graphic trends, labour markets and social security systems, see Horsewood 
and Neuteboom (2006).
In this thesis, primarily six countries are analysed and compared: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK; hereafter referred to as 
EU6. These countries were chosen partly on pragmatic grounds; the availabili-
ty of relevant data played a particularly important role. At the same time, they 
reflect more or less the current differences in mortgage take-up by owner-
occupiers within Europe. For example, though Belgium and the Netherlands 
share many institutions, the mortgage take-up is, in fact, extremely divergent. 
Conversely, the Netherlands and the UK have a more or less identical mort-
gage take-up, but different (social) institutions.
Secondly, the reference year for this study is 2003, the latest year for which 
sufficient information was available. Notwithstanding long-term EU coopera-
22 In this chapter, occasionally, a reference is made to Europe; this refers to the 15 EU member states, before the 
enlargement of 2005.
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tion, it is important to point out that differences exist not only in institutions 
but in economic cycles as well. Consequently, this section will finish off with 
a brief profile of the six countries in this study as in 2003 (see Table 3.1).
Across Europe, demographic patterns are dominated by two trends: indi-
[ 30 ]
Table 3.1 Key characteristics of the six countries in the study (EU6, 2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Nether lands UK
Demography
Population (ml.) 10.2 5.3 59.6 57.8 16.1 59.2
Households (ml.) 4.3 2.4 24.5 22.0 6.9 24.1
Annual growth of number  
of households (%)
0.8 0.9 1.2 n.a. 1.6 1.0
Dependency ratio1 (%) 52 50 53 48 47 53
Share 65+ (%) 17.0 14.8 16.3 18.4 13.7 15.7
Economy
GDP (EU 15 = 100) 117.7 121.6 112.3 107.2 125.5 116.2
Annual economic growth 
(%)
1.5 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.1 2.0
Inflation (%) 1.6 2.4 1.9 2.6 3.9 1.3
Interest rate2 (%) 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.6
Activity rate3 (%) 59.6 75.1 63.3 56.1 73.6 71.5
Unemployment (%) 8.0 5.6 9.5 8.4 3.7 4.9
Social security
Unemployment
Minimum duration (year) Unlimit. 8½ 3 ½ ½ ½
Replacement rate4 (%) 65.9 81.8 67.7 71.0 86.2 45.0
Pension
Retirement age (year) 58.5 60.9 58.8 59.9 62.2 62.3
Replacement rate5 (%) 82.2 41.9 59.1 69.5 53.2 33.6
Housing market
Homeownership rate (%) 68 52 56 77 52 69
Growth (in %p)6 9 -1 9 16 10 11
House prices7
(annual change in %) 1.6 1.1 1.4 2.3 2.8 3.4
Source: Eurostat, European Community Household Panel, European Central Bank, Housing Statistics 
in the European Union, Bank of International Settlements; Scruggs and Allan (2003) 
1. Dependency ratio is the number of household dependants younger than 15 and older than 65 
divided by the total population number of households aged 15 to 64; 2. 10-year Government bonds; 
3. Percentage of persons employed for more than 12 hours a week; 4. Benefits as a percentage of 
previous earnings from paid employment (net); 5. State pensions only; 6. Percentage point, over the 
period 1980-2003; 7. Average over 1970-2003 in real terms.
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vidualisation and ageing, both of which van be observed in many European 
countries, albeit to varying degrees. The trend towards individualisation is re-
flected in the rise in the number of single parents and single-person house-
holds (also due to some extent to the ageing population) and implies less sta-
bility in both household size and income. The influence of individualisation 
in household composition is reverberating on the risks of homeownership. To 
begin with, robust growth in the number of single households is increasing 
the demand for (owner-occupier) housing, which, in turn, co-determines price 
trends in the owner-occupier market. Meanwhile, uncertainty about the sta-
bility of the family is adding to the sense of insecurity; household dissolution 
as a percentage of the total number of families ranges annually from 0.5% in 
Portugal to 2.9% in the Netherlands; the household dissolution rate in other 
countries lies somewhere between these two extremes.
As mortgage payments are generally based on expectations of the future 
income streams of the household, the frequency, nature and consequences of 
interruptions in household income are crucially important. Two factors play 
a particularly important role here: the stability of the household as such (see 
before) and fluctuations in household income because of economic changes 
at macro level (linked to economic growth) and micro level. The workings of 
the labour market and the social security system are critical, and increasing 
European cooperation and globalisation heavily influence both.
Since the early post-war years, there has been a shift away from perma-
nent, secure jobs to more atypical or precarious jobs: more self-employment, 
part-time jobs, fixed-term and casual jobs and more frequent periods of un-
employment. This process has been accelerated in recent years by the trend 
towards more flexible labour markets. Note as well that the differences in un-
employment rates across Europe reflect different economic cycles.
These trends also have major implications for the social security systems 
in Europe. A high level of social security is counterbalanced by huge govern-
ment spending and high taxes (making labour more expensive). In periods 
of economic decline, as witnessed by many countries in the 1980s and early 
1990s, social security systems came under severe pressure. During these years, 
national governments across Europe tackled the high unemployment rates 
primarily by cutting labour costs (taxes) and stimulating employment. The 
downside of this strategy was, of course, growing budget deficits that, in turn, 
were addressed by cuts in government spending; hence, it was inevitable that 
the social system would be restructured. This trend was visible in most coun-
tries in Europe, with Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and the UK as 
the frontrunners. France and Germany were far slower to proceed down this 
road (Horsewood and Neuteboom, 2006).
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 3.2 Mortgage take-up across Europe
A macro approach: outstanding mortgages (see Table 3.2)
In most EU countries, the majority of households live in owner-occupied 
dwellings (Table 3.1). Although there is a high incidence of outright owner-
ship in the EU, many households need a mortgage to buy a home. Personal 
savings and family loans used to be important factors but are now declining 
across Europe. In addition, more and more people are remortgaging to release 
housing equity. These trends have led to a high level of outstanding mortgage 
debt throughout Europe. Indeed, in the 1990s, the outstanding mortgage debt 
in Europe more or less trebled. In 2003, outstanding mortgage debt add up to 
€3.9 trillion23 and is equal to one third of the entire gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the European Union (EU 15). Mortgages also account for over 40% of 
all outstanding bank credit. The growth has been so spectacular that, in many 
countries, the outstanding mortgage debt has even outstripped national debt. 
This situation can largely be explained by the deregulation of finance markets, 
strong economic growth, the increase in homeownership and a steep house 
price rise in real terms.
Despite closer European cooperation, there is no uniform pattern of mort-
gage take-up; at present, the level and growth rate differ considerably from 
country to country. In absolute terms, the UK and Germany do have the larg-
est national mortgage markets, but in terms of GDP, the Netherlands and (at 
a push) Denmark have the largest outstanding mortgage debt. This has not 
always been the case; the latter two countries in particular have experienced 
a sharp rise in outstanding mortgage debt in the past few decades. At the end 
of the 1980s they were both somewhere in the middle (Van Rooij and Stok-
man, 1999); things (appear to) have moved rapidly since then.
However, the outstanding mortgage debt expressed in percentage of GDP 
is a rather poor indicator of the risks of a high debt position. After all, it says 
very little about the total payment capability of the individual households, 
which are responsible for this debt. If it is spread across many households 
and the size of the individual debt is matched against the ability to pay, then 
not much can go wrong. But this situation may change if the mortgage debt is 
disproportionately spread across different (categories of) households; this cre-
ates risks for individual households with a large debt and eventually for the 
financial sector as a whole. One indicator of an unequal spread is the share of 
the outstanding mortgage debt borne by households with a high debt-service 
ratio; 30 to 35% is generally regarded as risky.
Table 3.2 clearly shows that in both the Netherlands and Denmark – which 
have the highest outstanding mortgage debt in percentage of GDP – only a 
23 The growth in outstanding mortgage debt continues, in 2005 it has risen to €5.1 trillion.
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small part of this debt lies with households in the high-risk group. Conversely, 
in the country with the lowest outstanding mortgage debt, Italy, as much as 
25% is borne by high-risk groups. The only ‘blot on the landscape’ is the UK, 
which combines a high outstanding debt with a relatively high share in the 
hands of high-risk groups.
Overall, there are wide differences in mortgage take-up in absolute terms and 
in relation to GDP, but if we focus on the share borne by the high-risk groups, 
the ranking changes dramatically and the differences turn out to be smaller.
A view from the micro level (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4)
Mortgage take-up also differs at micro level. In the comparison that follows 
the focus is on recent buyers, i.e. homeowners who bought their present 
property less than two years ago. These households provide a more up-to-
date, and hence, a more apt picture of the preferences and choices in the vari-
ous countries.
There are three indicators on a micro level that provide further insight into 
mortgage take-up: loan-to-income (LTI), loan-to-value (LTV), and debt-service 
ratio (DSR). The average outstanding mortgage debt as such says very little 
about the risks and the risk attitude of individual owner-occupiers. The out-
standing mortgage debt in relation to the value of the property and/or the 
net household income is a better indicator; a high loan-to-value ratio would 
constitute a potential capital risk for the individual owner-occupier (and the 
lender) if a crisis were to strike the property market. A high loan-to-income 
ratio potentially increases the probability of payment difficulties if the house-
hold suddenly suffers a drop in income.
Not surprisingly, under these conditions, loan-to-value ratios differ consid-
erably across Europe (Neuteboom, 2002), ranging from – on average – 80% or 
more in Northwest Europe to less than 50% in Southern Europe. For first-time 
buyers it can be as high as 112% in some countries, (e.g. the Netherlands). Tra-
ditionally, households can opt for three sources of finance: mortgage lending, 
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Table 3.2 Outstanding mortgages (EU6, 2003)
Outstanding mortgage debt Idem, in the hands of high risk-groups*
Absolute  
in billions 
Absolute  
in % GDP
Cumulative 
growth** 
Share DSR  
> 30%
Share DSR  
> 35%
Share DSR  
in % GDP
Belgium 78.3 28.5 8.2 2.8 2.1 0.2
Denmark 165.9 87.5 27.1*** 1.6 0.8 0.7
France 533.9 24.7 0.9 9.0 3.9 1.3
Italy 184.3 13.8 8.8 25.2 16.2 1.2
Netherlands 476.5 99.9 49.7 3.2 2.0 1.2
UK 1,129.6 70.4 15.9 13.2 8.5 3.3
Source: Eurostat, European Community Household Panel, European Central Bank, Housing Statistics 
in the European Union, Brounen et al. (2005)
* Here, high risk groups are defined as households with a high debt-service ratio (DSR); ** Over the 
period 1991-2003; *** 1993.
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personal savings and family loans. Households in Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the UK tend to choose mortgage lending, in France (and Germany) people 
are more inclined towards savings, while in Southern Europe the emphasis 
lies on a combination of savings and family loans.
Loan-to-income ratios range from just over 6 for recent buyers with a 
mortgage in the Netherlands to less than 2 in Belgium and Italy. Note that the 
definition of the loan-to-income ratio used here is based on the net house-
hold income instead of some definition of gross income, which may be more 
widely used but still makes for misleading comparisons, certainly in a cross-
country framework.
The debt-service ratio forms the third and crucial element in the analysis 
and estimation of both risks and risk attitudes (see Chapter 2). This indica-
tor sheds some light on the net cost of the mortgage chosen by an owner-
occupier (see Table 3.4 below), taking account of both the national systems of 
housing provision and the individual characteristics of the homeowner. At the 
same time, the debt-service ratio could serve as a prime indicator of unsus-
tainable homeownership: a high debt-service ratio triggers arrears, etc. Note 
that the debt-service ratio for recent buyers is high in both France and Italy, 
in contrast with the low outstanding mortgage debt in these countries. This 
somewhat paradoxical situation can be explained by the fact that households 
in these countries are so preoccupied on repaying the debt as soon as pos-
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Table 3.3 Mortgage take-up in the EU6: a micro view (2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Non-movers
Debt € 53,914 € 136,776 € 84,812 € 55,317 € 119,695 € 91,777
Loan to value 0.52 0.61 0.65 0.47 0.58 0.62
Loan to income 1.36 3.19 2.24 1.82 3.57 2.05
Dept-service ratio 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.16
Recent buyers
Debt € 69,291 € 182,937 € 104,439 € 65,352 € 194,982 € 123,642
Loan to value 0.67 0.82 0.79 0.56 0.95 0.84
Loan to income 1.66 4.76 3.07 2.29 6.26 2.72
Dept-service ratio 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.23
First-time buyers
Debt € 74,023 € 193,336 € 105,059 € 58,586 € 191,372 € 118,741
Loan to value 0.71 0.86 0.80 0.50 0.93 0.80
Loan to income 1.95 5.16 3.10 1.56 6.07 3.29
Dept-service ratio 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.22
Source: Eurostat, European Community Household Panel, European Central Bank; European 
Mortgage Federation
Average by country, LTV is based on outstanding debt and self-reported house price; LTI based on net 
household income.
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sible (in less than 15 years, see below) that they are prepared to accept a high 
debt-service ratio for a relatively short period.
Households can choose from literally hundreds of mortgages, each with a 
different risk profile. Despite the overwhelming choice, there are, in general, 
very few actual product differences. By far the most popular mortgages across 
Europe are still the annuity and/or the serial mortgage (see Table 3.4). Indeed, 
in many countries these are all that are on offer for the general public. Hold-
ers of such mortgages make capital as well as interest payments. This is in 
contrast with endowment and investment mortgages, where the holder does 
not make any payments towards the principal but deposits sums of money in 
a savings account so that he can pay off the entire debt when the mortgage 
expires. The downside of this option is that the mortgage-holder pays interest 
on the entire sum throughout the full duration of the mortgage contract.
Besides the amortisation scheme, typical duration and fixed interest rate 
period are important mortgage contract specifications; both are quite diver-
gent between countries. The average duration of a mortgage varies from 10 to 
15 years in France and Italy to a standard 30 years in the Netherlands24.
One of the more conventional ways in which owner-occupiers can reduce 
payment risks is to take out a mortgage with a long term of fixed interest. 
In Europe, the options range from one month (or less) to 30 years or more. A 
24 Nowadays, in Sweden and Japan, it is even possible to take out a mortgage for 40-50 years.
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Table 3.4 Mortgage take-up in the EU6: characteristics of mortgage contracts (2001/2)
Fixed interest rate period
Type 1
Duration 
(years)
Gross interest 
rate (%)2 Type 3
Duration 
(years)
Share 
(%) Early prepayment (penalty)
Belgium Repay 20 5.2 Ren, Fix 20 75 Yield maintenance fees
Denmark Repay 30 4.9 Fix, Ref 30 20 Administrative costs 
maximised by law to 0.6%
France Repay 17 4.1 Fix, Ref 12 40 Minimum of 6 months 
interest or 3% (secured 
by law)
Italy Repay 15 4.5 Fix, Ref 1/15 40 Fees are ~2%
Netherlands Endow 30 4.6 Rev, Fix 11 90 Yield maintenance fees 
UK Endow/Repay 25 6.5 Rev, Ren < 1 100 Administrative costs < 0.3% 
Source: Eurostat, European Community Household Panel, European Central Bank, Housing statistics in the European 
Union, Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003)
1. Repay(ment): annuity/serial mortgage; Endow(ment): savings or investment mortgage; 2. Gross mortgage interest rate 
for a standard mortgage with a fixed-interest period of 10 years, 1999; 3. Rev(iewable): the interest rate is changed at the 
end of the agreed period, the level being fixed by the lender; Ren(egotiable): the interest rate is changed at the end of the 
agreed period, with the borrower renegotiating the interest rate for the following period; Ref(erenced): the interest rate 
changes on the basis of an index pre-agreed by the parties, e.g. the interest on a given government bond; Fix(ed): the 
interest rate is fixed for the full term of the mortgage.
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variable interest rate is generally lower than a fixed interest rate, but it can 
fluctuate widely within the lifetime of the mortgage and affect the monthly 
payments accordingly. A fixed interest rate offers a large degree of assurance 
about the monthly costs but, as usual, it comes at a price: higher interest 
rates (the yield curve is normally upward sloping).
 3.3 Institutions that matter
One of main themes in this study is that an output indicator, such as mort-
gage take-up discussed in the previous section, is not a good indicator of ei-
ther the costs or risks that homeowners take on neither for the underlying 
risk attitudes. Institutional differences may go some way in explaining this 
difference. This section therefore analyses the differences and similarities in 
the institutional context across Europe.
First, we need to define the concept of institutions and institutional con-
text; both definitions will be used interchangeably in this study. A basic defi-
nition of institutions is: “organisations, or mechanisms of social structure, govern-
ing the behaviour of two or more individuals”.
A clear distinction needs to be drawn here between external and internal 
institutionalisation (Priemus, 1983). External institutionalisation consists of 
rules (laws) that are imposed – usually by the government – on the market 
players. Internal institutions consist of the norms and regulations imposed 
by private organisations. An intermediate form, in which agreements are 
reached at sector level on the conduct of companies and organisations, is 
coming under increasing pressure from financial authorities25. Here I shall fo-
cus primarily on external institutions. The internal institutions governing the 
‘mortgage industry’ are discussed in Section 3.5.
Here, various factors are relevant. The legal aspects (e.g. consumer protec-
tion), the social context (labour market flexibility, social security and financial 
support), systems of housing provision, and the structure of the property and 
mortgage markets all play a role. All these factors influence the (net) costs of 
homeownership and the distribution of risks among the different agents (bor-
rowers, lenders and/or the government). Both the social context and the sys-
tem of housing provision have a key influence on demand as they broaden the 
expenditure opportunities of households and reduce uncertainty about future 
income. This confidence leads to greater risk-taking behaviour – expressed in 
higher loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios – as well as a preference for 
long-term mortgages. Consumer protection and legislation, on the other hand, 
have a direct impact on the supply side of the market. Strong consumer rights 
25 Hampering competition and hence not in the interest of consumers.
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shift the risks of homeownership from the borrower to the mortgage lender; 
consumer rights limit the likelihood of arrears, with short-term and low loan-
to-value mortgages as a natural reaction from lenders.
The remainder of this section will concentrate on the housing finance sys-
tem and its context. Labour market issues and social security systems – of 
prime importance as well – have already been touched on in Section 3.1.
Systems of housing provision (see Table 3.5)
Across Europe there is a wide variety of schemes, which are designed to 
guarantee the affordability and attainability of homeownership (sometimes 
only for specific groups) and to limit the accompanying risks. These schemes 
have been overhauled in most countries in recent decades. Two trends have 
emerged: a shift from production subsidies to consumption subsidies and a 
stronger focus on the market (Ball and Grilli, 1997). The previously mentioned 
financial and economic crisis that hit many countries in the late 1980s is part-
ly responsible for this turn-around. While Southern European countries con-
tinued to operate subsidy systems, their Northern neighbours were pushing 
through fast and radical changes (Donner, 2000). Though it would even be fair 
to say that, in terms of their impact on housing and mortgage market out-
comes, the influence of simple tax deduction systems in Northern countries 
is much greater than the complex and multiple housing provisions systems 
in Southern Europe. See Doling and Ford (2003) and Elsinga et al. (2007) for a 
more up-to-date review of the developments and policy intentions in various 
European countries.
Mortgage interest tax relief is not only the most visible and direct form of 
subsidy in most countries, but also the one involving by far the biggest budg-
et. With the exception of France, Germany and the UK, all European countries 
run some system of mortgage interest tax relief (Boelhouwer et al., 2003). In 
Italy and Denmark, the rate is proportional; in other countries (Italy), the de-
ductions are maximised (at a level that is mostly irrelevant to the average 
owner-occupier). In Belgium26 and the Netherlands, mortgage interest tax re-
lief depends on marginal income rates.
The importance and applicability of other mortgage-subsidy schemes differ 
considerably according to the country. Usually, there are various co-existent 
schemes that may accumulate for some households and be denied to others. 
In general, eligibility depends on income, age, whether purchase or mainte-
nance is involved, and/or the position of the (potential) buyer on the housing 
market. These schemes can be split roughly into four categories:
26 In Belgium mortgage interest tax relief is maximised; on the other hand interest and repayments are both 
deductible. Recent policy changes in Belgium (2005) have improved the mortgage interest tax relief facility for 
Belgian homeowners.
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subsidised loans: loans which are offered at a lower rate of interest than  ■
the commercial rate, e.g. the Prêt à taux zero in France;
interest subsidies: income-dependent interest subsidies (comparable  ■
with the housing allowance system in the rental sector), e.g. the Agevolata 
scheme in Italy and Aide Personnalisé au Logement in France;
savings/lending plans, e.g. the famous  ■ Bausparkassen in Germany and the 
Caisse d’Epargne in France;
guarantees by public or private institutions: the Netherlands is the only  ■
country in Europe with a private guarantee institution, the Nationale Hy-
potheek Garantie (with public backing). Public equivalents exist in, amongst 
other countries, Denmark and France.
Table 3.5 also shows the average subsidy as a percentage of the gross mort-
gage payments for the various countries. This percentage is an average of 
what all borrowers in the respective countries have received (in 2001). The dif-
ferences speak for themselves and are not surprising given the above facts 
and the current debates on the issue.
Borrowers’ protection
Governments can also exercise a more direct influence on the outcomes of 
housing and mortgage markets: the legal context defines – or at least adjusts – 
the distribution of mortgage risks among borrowers, lenders and the govern-
ment. There are, moreover, differences in the way governments define the 
rights of borrowers. Some aspects are addressed in Table 3.6 (see EMF, 2003b; 
Dol and Neuteboom 2005 for a more exhaustive analysis).
One important benchmark is the European code of conduct: an agreement 
between lenders and the European Commission regarding minimum informa-
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Table 3.5 Mortgage interest tax relief and non-fiscal subsidies schemes in selected European countries (EU6, 
2001)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Mortgage 
interest tax relief
Yes, marginal 
rates1
Yes, flat rate No Yes, flat rate, 
max.
Yes, marginal None2
Subsidy rate3 23.1% 31.0% -- 11.4% 37.2% --
Non-fiscal 
(examples)
Minor subsidy 
programme 
for low income 
groups
Minor subsidy 
programme 
for young and 
retired
Housing 
allowance 
scheme
Minor subsidy 
programme 
for low income 
groups
Minor subsidy 
programme 
for low income 
groups
None
Subsidy rate 0.4% 0.1% 3.7% 0.3% -- --
Guarantees Yes, limited Yes Yes No Yes No (private)
Saving schemes No Yes, limited Yes No No No
Subsidised loan Yes No Yes Yes No No
Sources: Neuteboom (2000), European Community Household Panel, European Central Bank (2003), Mercer Oliver 
Wyman (2003), Doling and Ford (2003)
1. Repayments are also deductible; 2. Abolition completed in April 2001; 3. Estimated effective subsidy rate in % of gross 
mortgage payment.
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tion and ground rules for borrowers. This agreement has since been embed-
ded in the legislative systems of all EU countries. Some countries, including 
France and the UK, have added extra requirements, such as a duty of care for 
lenders, which makes lenders legally accountable for their lending practices, 
i.e. households in potentially risky situations should not be allowed to take 
out disproportionate loans.
Further, there are no uniform procedures in Europe for households in pay-
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Table 3.6 Borrowers’ protection (EU6, 2001/3)1
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Pre-contractual rights of borrower
Code of conduct + + -  1 + + -
Information rights ++ - ++ ++ - +
APRC2 + + + + + +
Pre-contractual duties of lender
Responsible lending + + + - + ++
Linking of services Authorised Not regulated Forbidden n.a. Not regulated Regulated
Insurances 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.2% 0.4%3 0.9%
Conclusion
Written offer binds + + + - + -
Right of reflection + + ++ - - +
Closing fees 2.1% 2.1% 2.2% 1.2% 2.2% 0.3%
Early prepayment
Right of withdrawal - - - - - -
Early prepayment -- + - - -- +
Usury regulation - + + + - -
Arrears
Contractual penalties - - + - - ++
Unpaid interest + - + - + +
Financial support Yes No Yes No No4 Yes 
Repossession
Juridical system Notaries Juridical Juridical Juridical Notaries Notaries
Repossession time (month) 18 6 15-45 60-84 6 8-12 
Administrative costs 18.7% n.a. 7.0% n.a. 3.0% 2.6-7.0%
Over-indebtedness + - + - + ++
Source: European Mortgage Federation (2003b); OECD (2004)
1. + Indicates compliance with the European code of conduct in national legislation, ++ extra requirements and - 
restriction and/or not implied; generally a positive sign indicates a favourable context for borrowers 2. APRC = Annual 
percentage rate of charge, i.e. gross interest rate plus additional costs; 3. Insurance obligation by lender. 4. Specific 
support not available, but generous social security systems. Note the availability of a large, competitive rental sector as an 
alternative (Neuteboom and Dol, 2005).
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ment difficulties or for repossessions. Penalty clauses are banned in many 
countries while repossession times range from less than six months in the 
Netherlands to over five years in Italy. Note that across Europe lenders have 
the right of recourse following repossession; in practice, there are differenc-
es on how stringent this right is executed. These gaps are directly reflected 
in the distribution of the risks between the borrower and the lender. There-
fore, it is hardly surprising that in countries like the Netherlands, where the 
consequences of arrears and repossessions are fast and severe, the number 
of households with payment difficulties is consistently lower than in other 
countries. The reverse is also true: in countries with a strong tradition of con-
sumer protection (e.g. in Southern Europe) lenders are not prepared – precise-
ly because of this tradition – to grant high mortgages to owner-occupiers.
All European governments provide general support for needy households 
through the social security system. However, the conditions, level and du-
ration of this support vary widely from country to country. In an increasing 
number of countries (including France and the UK), the government promotes 
self-protection by obliging mortgage-holders to take out insurance against ar-
rears due to long-term illness and invalidity.
Although, the diversity of the issues addressed in this section makes it dif-
ficult to sketch a more comprehensive picture, two trends are clearly visible: 
convergence across Europe in non-financial regulations and conservatism in 
the system of housing provision (Ball and Grilli, 1997).
 3.4 Differences and similarities amongst 
homeowners and borrowers
Next to the institutional context, differences in characteristics of (recent) buy-
ers may help to explain the distinct pattern of mortgage take-up and the ap-
parent diversity of the risk attitude of borrowers.
The characteristics of borrowers are portrayed here in three steps. First, 
Figure 3.1 depicts the share of owner-occupiers, borrowers and recent buyers 
in each country. Second, in Figure 3.2, the household profile of homeowners 
and recent buyers is described in more detail and compared across countries. 
The focus in the third part of this section is on households in arrears. Who 
are they, and which households are most at risk?
Differences in homeownership rates, ranging from just 50% in Denmark to 
over 75% in Italy, are well known and have been discussed above (Section 1.1) 
and elsewhere. The share of borrowers also differs across countries (see Sec-
tion 3.2); here Italy combines the highest homeownership rates with the low-
est share of borrowers (13%), while both Denmark and the Netherlands have 
low, but rising, homeownership rates coupled with a high numbers of borrow-
ers. There is less difference in the share of recent buyers, shown in Figure 3.1 
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by the size of the circles, but the stories behind this are quite dissimilar. The 
proportion of recent buyers among Italian homeowners is, for instance, rel-
atively high because Italian homeowners tend to repay their mortgage debt 
as soon as possible;, leaving a relatively small proportion of borrowers (and a 
relatively high proportion of recent buyers amongst them). The high number 
of recent buyers in, for instance, the UK is due to a high mobility rate (every 7 
to 8 years, compared to just once every 20 years in Italy).
Figure 3.2 shows the household characteristics of homeowners and recent 
buyers. The profiles are based on six attributes: age, income, household size 
(i.e. percentage of singles), source of income (i.e. percentage of employed), the 
share of single-earners, and finally, the percentage of highly educated mem-
bers in both groups. Together, these factors form a distinctive risk profile for 
the average homeowner/recent buyer. The results are presented as z-scores to 
facilitate a cross-country comparison between the different factors.
The foremost conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 3.2 is that – com-
pared with the European average (EU6) – households in the UK are older, have 
a higher income, have a relatively higher proportion of singles27 (and in com-
bination), are more often single-earners, and have a relatively high level of 
27 In accordance with the demographic patterns discussed in Section 3.1.
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education. All these characteristics imply that their risk profile is better than 
the average ‘European’ homeowner is. On the downside, their source of in-
come seems to be less secure as their jobs tend to be more precarious (self-
employed). Given the high proportion of borrowers and recent buyers, the 
profile is quite similar for both.
The same type of analysis can be conducted for other countries. The main 
results can be sketched as follows. Belgian homeowners score an ‘average’ 
profile; only the percentage of singles among recent buyers is considerably 
lower than elsewhere. Therefore, they seem to be playing safe, given the low 
mortgage take-up in Belgium. Italian homeowners, on the other hand, have a 
rather high-risk profile: their income is low and uncertain (high share of non-
employed and low educated). Even the risk profile for French homeowners, 
notwithstanding their low mortgage take-up, seems to be relatively high, al-
though not as distinctive as for Italian homeowners. Danish homeowners are 
relatively well off, also due to the low number of single-earners. Finally, Dutch 
homeowners are rather young and have a low income, but income-security is 
relatively high28.
It seems that high mortgage take-up in some countries, including the 
Netherlands and the UK, is partly compensated by a better profile for (pro-
spective) homeowners. In most countries, the profile for recent buyers is not 
much different from the profile for borrowers in general (as to be expected).
Households at risk
Table 3.7 reports the three measurements of unsustainable homeownership 
mentioned earlier: households experiencing housing costs as a heavy bur-
den, the incidence of mortgage arrears, and the number of repossessions. It 
is clear from Table 3.8 that for every household in arrears there are – on aver-
age – eight households who experience their housing costs as a heavy finan-
cial burden. Ultimately, less than 5% of them will face repossession29.
The characteristics of households in arrears have been well researched 
(see Neuteboom and Dol (2005) for an overview). Most researchers use a logis-
tic regression approach to identify households that are more at risk; i.e. the 
in-arrears group is compared with the not-in-arrears group. In these analyses, 
a set of socio-economic characteristics is used as explanatory variables. Bur-
rows (1998), for instance, used this procedure for the UK while Neuteboom 
and Dol (2005) performed a similar analysis on a cross-country basis and con-
firmed earlier country-by-country studies. Households in low-income groups 
28 The ECHP does not offer reliable information on the education level of Dutch households. Additional analysis 
on the Dutch Housing Need Survey reveals that both borrowers and recent buyers are relatively well educated.
29 Note that this implies that most arrears are just temporary; mainly because households in arrears were able 
to adopt strategies to overcome their problems (or a positive change in income or interest rates occurred).
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are significantly more at risk than others; so are single parents (single per-
sons are not at risk; this statistic is partly explainable by the relatively high 
number of elderly persons with minimum outstanding mortgages). Also over-
represented are self-employed households – because of insecurity of income – 
and households with a low educational level (diminishing labour opportuni-
ties). Obviously, households with other debts are also significantly more at 
risk. Finally, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, recent buyers do not run more 
risks than non-movers do. Though, on average, they have more outstanding 
debt than non-movers do, the risk-assessment procedures applied by lenders 
ensure that, in the short term, the debt-service ratio is within limits. There-
fore, arrears are unlikely. However, as time passes, the probability of unfore-
seen events increases, and hence the probability of arrears30.
 3.5 National mortgage markets
A host of rules and regulations governed mortgage markets in Europe until 
the mid-1980s and early 1990s (Bakker, 1996). A lot has changed since. Finan-
cial deregulation, partly ‘forced’ through EU directives, has brought about ma-
jor changes in the (inter)national mortgage markets. The UK started deregu-
lating its financial system in the early 1980s, followed later by other countries. 
The policy changes included the abolition of interest-rate ceilings and the re-
laxation of quantitative credit controls31 and/or contractual restrictions. From 
the 1990s onward, independent public bodies carried out financial supervision, 
30 The analysis does not reveal whether the characteristics of a household in arrears changed for the worse after 
taking out the mortgage, but it does give some indication that borrower characteristics differ across countries 
and that this difference can (partly) explain the current pattern of unsustainable home-ownership across coun-
tries.
31 For instance, in Italy the maximum loan-to-value ratio for secured loans was raised from 50% to 90%.
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Table 3.7 Some measurements of unsustainable homeownership (per 1,000 outstanding 
mortgages) (EU6, 2001)
Housing costs =  
heavy burden Mortgage arrears Repossessions1 
Belgium 224 38 0.16
Denmark 81 5 0.77
France 163 17 n.a.
Italy 4502 51 n.a.
Netherlands 11 8 0.3
UK 54 9 1.61
Source: European Community Household Panel, Neuteboom (2002), Housing Statistics in the EU 
1. Average 1996-2001; 2. Italian homeowners are rather pathetic anyway, more than 5 million 
households complained about high housing costs even when they consist only of local taxes and 
maintenance.
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e.g. the FSA in the UK or the AFM in the Netherlands, see for instance BIS 
(2006) and EC (2006). These institutions were set up to regulate the financial 
industry and to protect consumers by, amongst other things, stipulating lend-
ing practice (European code of conduct). Barriers preventing (foreign) lenders 
from entering the mortgage market were also lifted. Governments took a back 
seat; subsidised mortgages were either abolished or increasingly confined to 
specific groups. The 1990s saw a wave of mergers and lender privatisations, 
which increased economies of scale. Finally, the secondary market started to 
get off the ground, although it should be said that the combined secondary 
market in Europe is still only a fraction of the size of the secondary market in 
the USA (EMF, 2004).
All these changes triggered spectacular growth in the mortgage market, not 
only in terms of outstanding mortgages but also in terms of product variation 
and in mortgage accessibility for (prospective) homeowners32. Despite all of 
this, the general trend towards liberalisation in Europe has not led to a single 
integrated European mortgage market. Indeed, the market is still fragmented 
along national lines. The financial barriers can be gradually overcome but the 
non-financial barriers (legislation, regulations, subsidy systems etc.) contin-
ue to obstruct the evolution of a uniform mortgage market (Stephens, 2000; 
ECB, 2003). In the end, this inhibits competition, pushes up interest rates and 
impedes financial innovation (a narrower range of mortgages and hence less 
choice).
Although the liberalisation has led to a break down of formal rules, lend-
ers in the Netherlands and abroad maintain their own set of rules, governing 
their lending criteria. Two different systems are being used: risk-based pric-
ing and/or credit rationing. Theoretically, risk-based pricing should be benefi-
cial in the mortgage market, because it allows lenders to price their products 
more accurately in terms of the (credit) risks incurred by lending to specific 
households. For instance, a high loan-to-value ratio increases the credit risk 
and should be priced accordingly (i.e. higher interest rates). With the excep-
tion of the UK, risk-based pricing is not common in the ‘mortgage industry’.
In continental Europe the most widely applied system is (still) credit ra-
tioning. Before the liberalisation, this was regulated by the national govern-
ment, which sometimes laid down highly specific conditions for the granting 
of mortgages. Nowadays, though regulations exist in very few countries (see 
Table 3.10), the internal institutions, such as the level of the maximum debt-
service ratio and the credit history of the applicant, are still normative in the 
market. The aim here is to keep high-risk groups out of the mortgage markets 
and enforce a uniform interest rate on all borrowers. Effectively, under this 
32 Of course, rapid economic growth and a steady decline of interest rates contributed to the growth of (na-
tional) mortgage markets as well.
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system, low-risk borrowers pay for high-risk borrowers. Although, this system 
does not necessarily lead to higher risks for lenders, it hampers the develop-
ment of national mortgage markets and prevents high-risk borrowers – such 
as low-income households – from getting a foot in the door. Sometimes, the 
system of credit rationing is maintained by government regulations, but more 
often nowadays lenders are put off by the prospect of losing market share, 
when risk-based pricing is not the market norm.
The implementation of the Basle II Accord – which introduced new regula-
tory capital requirements – is expected to increase risk-based mortgage pricing.
Product variation
Above (Section 3.2) I sketched a picture of the mainstream mortgages in the 
different countries. Obviously, these findings cannot be interpreted only as 
the result of the choices of owner-occupiers; the options available in each 
country also play a role. Differences still exist between the countries but are 
being gradually bridged (see Mercer Oliver Wyman, 2003; 2005, for more de-
tails). Table 3.8 presents an overview of the mortgage products that are avail-
able in the different countries.
Owner-occupiers in Europe can choose from a whole range of mortgages, 
from the traditional linear product to the more fashionable investment mort-
gage. They can also choose between a long-term and a short-term mortgage 
and opt for a fixed-interest period of anything up to thirty years. There is, 
however, a wide variation in the types of mortgages available within Europe; 
for example, over 4,000 products are marketed in the UK, although the differ-
ences between them are not always very great (Early, 2005). In many (South-
ern) European countries, on the other hand, the range is fairly limited for 
most customers as a lot of mortgage types are available only to low-risk cus-
tomers33.
In the 1990s, the mortgage product range expanded in the wake of the dereg-
ulation of the finance markets. With the exception of Italy, the differences be-
tween the countries are now small and are being kept alive by traditions and 
specific aspects of the institutional context. The expectation is that a greater 
choice will emerge in Europe and the differences between the countries will 
gradually fade (Mercer Oliver Wyman, 2003) because of, amongst others, cross-
border lending and mergers. However, this does not, imply automatically that 
the demand for these products will be the same in each country.
Borrowers’ accessibility
Nowadays, borrowers have better access to mortgages than in the past. The 
33 Mortgage contract heterogeneity – over time and across countries – is, of course partly based on different tra-
ditions but is also well explainable in terms of differences in funding requirements and regulation (Leece, 2004).
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growth in homeownership rates, the share of borrowers and the average out-
standing mortgage debt show that more and more households are finding 
their way to the mortgage markets.
In general, the range of mortgage products available, as show in table 
3.8, is on an individual level more limited. On one hand, lenders do not ap-
prove every mortgage type for each customer (credit rationing, see discus-
sion above); the wealthy – in terms of either housing wealth or household in-
come – have more opportunities than for instance first-time buyers. On the 
other hand, homeowners are choosing quite often the mortgage with the low-
est initial costs; setting aside, for instance, short-term repayment mortgages. 
Although in each country credit constraint borrowers do exist – for instance 
some first-time buyers – empirical evidence shows that many do not borrow 
to their maximum limits (Breslaw et al., 1996, see also Chapter 5).
Table 3.9 contains some information on mortgage accessibility for differ-
ent types of borrowers and/or purposes. High-risk groups such as low-income 
households and the self-employed are not automatically excluded in all coun-
tries (e.g. the Netherlands, the UK) but in the majority of countries, including 
Belgium and France, many potential high-risk groups are denied access to the 
mortgage market. Not surprisingly, Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003) concluded 
that “… we observe that sub-prime and non-conforming lending (where there are 
significant differences in price to account for differing risks) is only significant in the 
UK with all other markets having only an emerging or non-existent high risk lending 
market” (ibid, pp. 38). In defence, it would be fair to say that in most countries 
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Table 3.8 Mortgage product availability (EU6, 2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Interest rates  
(fixed interest rate periods)
Variable      
Referenced      
Discounted      
Capped      
Duration
2-5 years      
5-10 years      
10-20 years      
20+ years      
Mortgage type
Amortising      
Interest only      
Flexible      
Source: Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003)
 = readily available;  = limited availability;  = not available
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a subprime market is not yet necessary because (local) governments provide 
additional guarantees (Section 3.3).
 Nevertheless, here as well, things are changing. Financial deregulation and 
the entrance of new lenders are continuously reshaping the market and slow-
ly bridging the gap between high-access and low-access national mortgage 
markets.
 3.6 Some preliminary conclusions
It is not easy to sketch a clear picture and to produce a ranking-order of the 
different countries, on mortgage take-up, institutions, (prospective) home-
owners or national mortgage markets. In terms of mortgage take-up, it is in-
deed possible to categorise high debt countries (Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the UK) versus low debt countries (Belgium, France, Italy); a distinction 
that is both valid on a macro and micro level. However, the implications in 
terms of costs and risks for individual homeowners remain obscure.
The reasons are straightforward: there is not one indicator or even a set 
of indicators, that could objectively capture the differences across countries 
on any of the four mentioned themes and certainly, the interdependence be-
tween those themes cannot adequately be addressed.
Although, the analysis in this chapter does not inform us on the expected 
costs and associated risks, however, it does informs us that differences on 
these themes are significantly across countries. It also reveals that the partial 
effects on costs and risks can be substantive (e.g. housing provision). There-
fore, while mortgage take-up in the Netherlands is, by far, the highest in the 
EU6 (on both a macro and micro level) and consumer protection is just mod-
erate, on the other hand, the analysis also showed that the risk profile of bor-
rowers is better than the ‘average’ in the EU6 and the housing provision sys-
tem is relatively generous.
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Table 3.9 Mortgage accessibility (EU6, 2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Borrower
Young (<30 year)      
Older (>50 year)      
Low equity      
Self-employed      
Credit impaired      
Purpose
Second mortgage      
Equity release      
Source: Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003)
 = readily available;  = limited availability;  = not available
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For this study, it is necessary that the full effects of mortgage take-up, in-
stitutions, characteristics of (prospective) homeowners and national mortgage 
markets on the expected net costs and risks be coherently quantified. That 
way, one can not only compare costs and risks across countries, based on one 
common denominator, but also determine the underlying risk attitudes.
[ 49 ]
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 4 Modelling the ex-ante 
probabilities of 
mortgage arrears and 
repossessions34, 35
 4.1 Introduction
To evaluate the mortgage choices and choice behaviour of individual home-
owners and ultimately their risk attitude, we need a common denominator. 
Evaluating the outcomes in terms of mortgage contracts will not suffice, since 
mortgage contracts are often complex and differ in many aspects. What is 
needed is to redefine mortgage contracts in terms of consequences, hence 
costs and risks (here: arrears and repossessions). Since, these consequences 
are not clear (certain) to individual households when they choose from differ-
ent mortgage contracts, as the future costs (e.g. interest rates) and income are 
uncertain. It seems that the best way to proceed is to compute the expected 
costs and risks (the ex-ante approach), “by effectively accounting for every pos-
sible value that each variable could take and weighting each possible scenario by the 
probability of its occurrence” (Vose, 1996, p. 8). This can be achieved by applying 
a Monte Carlo Simulation.
A Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) is a ‘forward-looking’ analytical method, 
based on the historical probability distributions of parameters. It is particu-
larly useful for tackling path-dependent or history-dependent problems (Vose, 
1996; Trigeorgis, 1996). MCS is a method for iteratively evaluating a determin-
istic model, using sets of random numbers as input. It is often used when the 
model is complex, non-linear, or involves more than just a few uncertain pa-
rameters. Generally, the MCS approach consists of the following steps (Boyle 
et al., 1997): first, it simulates scenarios of the underlying institutional vari-
ables (here: interest rates, house prices, household income etc.) over the rel-
evant time horizon, and second, it computes the discounted value of – in this 
case – the annual net costs or debt-service ratio. The annual net costs and the 
debt-service ratio are then no longer characterised by one – i.e. the most like-
ly – outcome, but by a probability distribution of all possible outcomes. The 
variation in the results can then serve as a basis for determining the risk (Tri-
georgis, 1996).
Within the context of mortgage choice models a simulation approach has 
been applied by for instance Milevsky (2001), Templeton et al. (1996) and Tuck-
er (1991). Their aim was to study choices of households between fixed and 
adjustable interest rates. Their models were rather static, calculating the net 
present value difference for different types of mortgages with just one ran-
34 Some of the more technical details are left out of the core text of this chapter; these issues are added, as an 
appendix (technical note), at the end of this chapter.
35 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Neuteboom (2003).
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dom variable: mortgage interest rates. The basic assumption in these models 
is that households follow the costs minimisation hypothesis (Breslaw et al., 
1996): households that were not constrained by affordability considerations 
were to assume choosing the mortgage with the lowest expected cost over the 
full duration of the mortgage while constraint borrowers would focus on the 
immediate, first-year, costs. Given the finite nature of these models, I will not 
discuss them here in-depth, but acknowledge that these models have paved 
the way for a newer generation of models (see Leece, 2004 for an overview).
The model presented here, is in line with the research by Yang et al. (1998), 
Capozza et al. (1998) and Campbell and Cocco (2003), although the usage and 
exact specification are quite divergent. Yang et al. and Capozza et al., both 
used a simple stochastic model to research the probabilities of mortgage de-
fault under different conditions, i.e. fundamental changes in interest rates 
and house prices or a different set of initial premises; in other words, differ-
ent loan-to-value ratios. The model of Capozza et al. consisted of a house price 
model and an interest rate model. Arrears occurred when the total expected 
cost of the mortgage was higher than the actual house prices (i.e. the analysis 
was based on the equity hypothesis discussed in Chapter 2.3). Yang et al. ex-
tended the model by incorporating an income model as well. They shared the 
same interest as Capozza et al. but their starting point was the ability-to-pay 
hypothesis, so default occurred when the housing/mortgage costs-to-income 
ratio was higher than a given hurdle rate. Their model offered a much better 
explanation of historical arrears.
In this research, the aim is to model the costs and risks of different types 
of mortgages in order to get a clear picture of the choice patterns of home-
owners. The study by Campbell and Cocco came close to this. They used a sto-
chastic model to investigate, in the US, how the optimal choice of a home-
owner for a fixed-rate as opposed to a variable-rate mortgage was conditioned. 
They enhanced the models described above with a more sophisticated in-
come model; in their version of the income model the macro-uncertainty for 
household income (economic growth, inflation) was modelled together with 
the micro-uncertainty (household dissolution, unemployment).
The model presented below (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) differs in many respects 
from theirs, mainly because it focuses more explicitly on the institutional 
context as well as the different mortgage and household characteristics36.
36 Of course, the exact specification of the income, house price and interest models differs as well, but these dif-
ferences are rather small, certainly compared with Campbell and Cocco and Yang et al.
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 4.2 Model specification
The simulation model I used in this research to compute the expected costs 
and risks of a mortgage consists of five sub-models (see Figure 2.2), which 
simulate interest rates, household income, house prices, stock market devel-
opments and inflation. In this section, these five sub-models will be discussed 
one by one.
Interest rates
First, I start with modelling the spot rate (1 month) followed by the derivation 
of the interest rate for different maturities (yield curve). The basic model37 ap-
plied here is the stochastic differential equation:
(1) dr t = λ (µ−rt )dt+σ√r t −1 dX1
in which λ  is the speed of adjustment of the short-term actual interest rate 
r t  to the long-term mean µ  and σ√r t −1 is the implied volatility. When µ > σ/2, 
interest rates remain positive. The last term dX1 is a random variable drawn 
from a normal distribution with the following properties:
dX1 = ϕ√dt
E [dX1]  = 0
E [dX 21 ]  = 1
The model is a mean-reverting process (λ (µ − r t )dt ), implying that if r t > µ , in-
terest rates will move down on average, although the random term σ√r t −1 dX1 
can make interest rates rise, on balance, even when they are above average 
(and vice versa). This model can be used to simulate different scenarios for 
possible future interest rates (paths) for the total duration of the mortgage.
So far, the process has yielded the expected spot interest rate, i.e. the in-
terest rate for loans with duration of one month. From there, we must derive 
the interest rates for loans with different maturities and fixed-term periods 
as well as the appropriate interest rates for residential mortgages. By utilising 
a default-free discount bond model P(t,T)  (see equation 1b), we can derive 
the – theoretical – equilibrium interest rates for different maturities (Rebon-
ato, 1998; Chen et al., 1995), in short the yield-curve:
(1b) rt t = 
−ln(P(t ,T))
(T−t)
37 The so-called CIR model is named after Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). See Rebonato (1998) for further details.
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P(t,T) = A(t,T)e−rt B(t ,T)
and
A(t,T) = 
φ1e φ2τ
φ2 [e φ2τ−1 ]+φ1
 
φ3
, B(t ,T) = 
e φ2τ−1
φ2 [e φ2τ−1 ]+φ1
 
φ1 = √λ2 + 2σ2, φ2 = 
λ+φ1
2
, φ3 = 
2λµ
σ2
, τ  = T−t
in which rt t represents the interest rate in year t with a fixed interest period 
of T. The parameters λ , σ , µ  follow from equation 1. Hence, the yield curve is a 
function of the short-term rate r t.
An increase in the actual interest rate increases yields for all maturities, 
but the effect is greater for shorter maturities. Similarly, as r t > µ , all yields 
increase but the effect is greater for shorter durations. Indeed, it is possible 
for a downward sloping yield curve to arise, which implies that the ‘market’ 
expects lower interest rates (lower inflation) in the near future. A decreasing 
yield curve is not only a theoretical option, but also a rare, temporal, phenom-
enon that occurs in practice38.
From the actual yield curve, it is easy to derive the interest rates for a 
mortgage. In the model, the interest rate calculated with equations 1a and 
1b is supplemented with a spread, i.e. the difference between mortgage in-
terest and the interest on a comparable government bond. This spread itself 
is a function of both the short-term rate and the fixed-interest period, being 
relatively low when the short-term rates are below the long-term mean and 
relatively high when fixed periods increase. This means that the yield curve 
for mortgage rates shifts proportionally when interest rates are low while the 
slope of the curve decreases with higher interest rates.
The model also takes account of interest rate conversion after the agreed 
fixed-interest period have ended and incorporate the possibility of early pre-
payment as well (i.e. checking whether it is profitable to make an early pre-
payment on the loan, given the different costs and penalties).
For an illustration see Figure 4.1, where the different mortgage interest rates 
are derived from one estimated interest (spot) rate path. This figure is based 
on the Dutch setting.
Net household income
Net household income is determined by a whole range of factors: at the mac-
ro level by general trends in income, based on economic growth, and at micro 
level by, for example, changes in the status in the labour market (e.g. redun-
dancy or promotion) and/or demographic factors (e.g. divorce). Changes at the 
38 See, for instance, the period 1991-1992 in the Netherlands and the period 1997-1998 in the UK.
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macro level might have a relatively modest effect on individual household in-
comes, but changes at the micro level may have a deep impact.
The literature offers two basic models to define and estimate develop-
ments of net household income:
a ‘mover-stayer’ model in which the household income either remains the  ■
same (‘stayer’) or takes a clear upward or downward turn as a result of pro-
motion or redundancy (‘mover’);
a purely random walk model (like equations 3 and 4, see below). ■
Since we know from earlier research that net household income is the most 
important determinant of unsustainable homeownership (see Chapter 2), it 
is vital that the model captures both macro economic variations and micro 
income changes. The latter includes loss of job or retirement, but also demo-
graphic transformations such as divorce; changes that can be expected to 
have a huge impact on household income and hence on the sustainability of 
the mortgage payments.
Dutta et al. (2001) have developed a model, which may be regarded as a 
synthesis of the two basic models. This model fits perfectly within the con-
ceptual model, because it takes account of both macro and micro changes. It 
is a binominal model in which households either do not experience a leap in 
net income (+ or -/-) – in which case, net household income follows a random 
walk model – or the other way around. This model is shown in equation 2:
(2)
  Prob. θ	 dyt = µdt + σdX2 
 Prob. (1−θ )  dyt = 
~yt /y t−1
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It ‘reads’ as follows: with probability θ  no significant changes will take place 
in the household income; hence, the household income will change from year 
to year according to a simple random walk model. Here µ  and σ  represent 
the average growth rate and standard deviation (based on historical patterns). 
With probability (1−θ )  a significant positive or negative change will occur in 
the household income. In these cases, the model assigns the household a new 
net household income ~yt, which is drawn randomly from the income distribu-
tion. The new household income is ~yt drawn from the distribution N(
~µt , 
~σ t), in 
which ~µt  and 
~σ t are the mean and variance of the recurrent distribution.
Note that we can expect both the probability θ  and the new household 
income ~yt to depend significantly on country-specific circumstances; i.e. θ 
and ~yt are influenced, amongst other things, by the degree of deregulation of 
the labour market and the level of social security in the country.
The model also takes account of the social security system in a country. I.e. 
the change in income may be limited downward because of unemployment 
benefits in place, while the anticipated income reduction after retirement 
may have less impact.
House prices
Trends in house prices do not have a direct influence on the net costs or the 
affordability of a house. However, they do have a significant effect on the eq-
uity risks of a household. The model used here to estimate house prices is a 
simple random walk model:
(3) dht = µdt + σdX3  
Here the house price is ht. The factor µdt  is the so-called drift rate while is 
σdX3 a normal random variable. In the short term, house price movements 
are mainly determined by the volatility factor, in the longer term the drift rate 
gains in importance and the cumulative drift rate tends towards ∑µdt .
Stock market
The sub-model, which simulates stock market developments takes exactly 
the same form (and makes the same assumptions) as the house price model 
and therefore needs no further explanation here:
(4) dht = µdt + σdX4
Obviously, stock market developments only come into play if the mortgage is 
investment-based.
Inflation
The inflation, used for the calculation of the net present values, is derived 
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from the Fisher equation:
(1+pt )  = (1+rt )/(1+i t )
in which pt represents the real interest rate and i t represents the inflation. If 
we assume that the real interest rate (  p )  is constant, it follows that:
(5) i t = (r t−p )/(1+p )
Finally, the four sub-models – equations 1 to 4 – are, of course, mutually in-
terdependent, meaning that future developments in interest rates, income, 
property prices and the stock market are – as in the past – intertwined (for 
instance, rising interest rates bring down the property prices, ceteris paribus); 
“the model therefore must be restricted to prevent it from producing, in any iteration, 
a scenario that could not physically occur” (Vose, 1996, p. 191). One way of do-
ing that is by generating the different random numbers dX1 – dX4 as being 
multi-correlated. Second, when more than one random number is used in a 
simulation and the relevant probabilities are rather small (here, for example, 
the probability of repossessions is expected to be very small), many simula-
tions are required to ensure that the results remain reliable. Then it becomes 
increasingly important to implement variance-reduction techniques to keep 
computing time within limits without losing accuracy. Both issues are dealt 
with in technical note 4.1 at the end of this chapter.
 4.3 Calculating the debt-service ratio and the 
probability of arrears and repossessions
The previous section explained how the scenarios for the exogenous factors 
are determined. This section will focus on the expected costs and the calcula-
tion of the default and equity risks.
The net monthly mortgage payments can be computed based on the sce-
narios generated by the models 1 to 5 (e.g. developments in interest rates and 
income), in conjunction with the type of mortgage, household characteris-
tics and the institutional context. The default risks can be deduced based on 
(monthly) net costs in relation to net household income. The equity risks can 
then be determined by ascertaining the incidence of payment problems in 
combination with trends in property prices versus the outstanding mortgage 
debt.
Expected costs
The net monthly (or annual) costs can be calculated as follows:
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MEt = [1−τ (Yt ) ]r t MDt+At*+Dt*+Kt(MDt )−St(Yt )
MDt = MDt−1−At*
in which [1−τ (Yt ) ]r t represents the net interest charges; At*  and Dt*  the sched-
uled repayments; Kt(MDt )  the additional costs of a mortgage; and St(Yt )  the 
additional, non-fiscal subsidies. At*  and Dt*  depend on the type of mortgage: 
the model distinguishes between linear, annuity-based, endowment, and 
investment-based. In linear and annuity-based mortgages, annual payments 
are made towards the principal throughout the life of the mortgage (At* > 0 ). 
This system does not apply to the other mortgage types. With endowment 
and investment-based mortgages the annual payments towards the principal 
are replaced by contributions to a fund (Dt* > 0 ), which are then either deposit-
ed in a special savings account or used for purchasing shares (funds). The ad-
ditional charges Kt are directly dependent on the outstanding mortgage debt 
and relate to the one-off costs (commission, taxes) and the annual obligatory 
(servicing) costs and/or compulsory insurances. Some households may also 
be eligible for St, i.e. non-fiscal subsidies designed to ease the financial burden 
of a mortgage. Eligibility for these subsidies usually depends on the house-
hold income and sometimes on the composition of the household. Finally, the 
net present value is calculated from the net annual mortgage payments; this 
means that the time value of the future payments and (any) returns are taken 
into account. The result is a probability distribution of the expected mortgage 
payments, based on the N-scenarios (see also Figure 4.2).
Debt-service ratio
Dividing monthly (annual) net mortgage payments by net household income, 
as simulated by sub-model 2, shows the development of the debt-service ratio. 
This ratio is crucial in the analysis, since it is used as a forward indicator of 
unsustainable homeownership. Like the expected costs, discussed above, the 
results of the N-scenarios can be regarded as a probability distribution; a ficti-
tious example is shown in Figure 4.2.
The default probabilities can be easily calculated from this distribution and 
– with some supplementary calculations – so can the repossession rate.
Arrears
Mortgage arrears occur when an owner-occupier is no longer able to meet the 
financial commitments he has undertaken for the purchase of his home. Ar-
rears may be the result of an unexpected increase in housing costs (due to a 
rise in the interest rate) or a drop in net household income (due to unemploy-
ment, a reduction in working time or a divorce). Not every change in housing 
costs or income will automatically result in arrears. Owner-occupiers general-
ly have a buffer to absorb any setbacks, but eventually when the debt-service 
ratio increases, arrears become more likely, until P(DSRt ≥	δ ) .
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At this point they become unavoidable. Here δ  represents the so-called ‘hurdle 
rate’, i.e. the debt-service ratio that leads inevitably to unsustainable home-
ownership, or more specifically, mortgage arrears. Although one can expect 
this hurdle rate to be dependent on time, actual net income, and the institu-
tional context, I assume a constant hurdle rate for all countries. In Figure 4.2, 
this area is labelled ‘risk contingency’.
Repossessions
When arrears become long-standing, the household eventually has to move, 
either voluntarily or because of a compulsory sale. Such households may then 
be confronted with the added problem of (the risk of) lost capital. Therefore, 
the probability of being forced to move / being evicted is
P(DSRt+i. .t+n >  δ )
in which i – n is equal to the repossession time in a specific country. The times-
cale between the start of mortgage arrears and a compulsory or ‘voluntary’ 
sale depends primarily on the legal situation. As mentioned earlier, in the UK, 
the day of reckoning arrives after only six months of uninterrupted arrears, 
whereas in some Southern European countries it can take up to five or seven 
years. The model assumes that if a household is confronted with successive 
payment arrears during a nationally determined period (ranging from ½ to 6 
years, see Table 3.6), the next step is the compulsory or voluntary sale of the 
property.
If the sum of the outstanding mortgage debt and the arrears turns out to be 
higher than the selling price, the household faces (the risk of) capital loss. Ear-
lier, the equity risk was defined as the probability of negative equity, given the 
existence of mortgage arrears; this is therefore the conditional probability:
P(Pt+Dt−MDt |  DSRt+i. .t+n >  δ )
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This is not, incidentally, the only situation in which negative equity can arise. 
The assumption in other cases is that the household in question has at least 
the opportunity to postpone the sale until a more favourable moment; in 
these circumstances, there is actually some sort of ‘virtual’ negative equity.
As property prices tend to rise steadily, the risk of negative equity is obvi-
ously greatest when the initial loan is taken out; on the other hand, the pros-
pect of a crisis on the housing market and a downward spiral in the price of 
property should not be downplayed. In other words, there is still a realistic 
probability of negative equity after a longer period, especially if the house-
hold has opted for a mortgage in which payments towards the principal are 
deferred until a later date.
 4.4 Estimation procedure
Data and empirical methodology
Data on the institutional factors were presented in Chapter 3. The model 
makes explicit use of:
mortgage interest tax relief system [  ■ τ (  Y t )  ];
non-fiscal subsidies [ S ■ t  ];
any additional costs [  ■ KtMDt ] (insurance obligations and closing fees);
five different types of mortgages; ■
mortgage characteristics: duration, fixed-interest period, and prepayment  ■
fines;
financial support for households in arrears (public or private); ■
unpaid interest due when in arrears; ■
repossession time. ■
The necessary (minimum) data on household characteristics used in the 
model was also discussed above (Section 3.4). In what follows, data is used on 
the income, outstanding mortgage and the loan-to-value, loan-to-income and 
debt-service ratios.
The different parameters of the model, represented by equations 1-5, were 
estimated as follows. First, the estimation of the interest model: the basic 
equation was estimated by using weighted least square, as suggested by Chen 
et al. (1995) (see appendix A for a more comprehensive analysis). Second, the 
estimation of the income model implied maximum likelihood estimation (see 
Dutta, 1997) (see Appendix A for further elaboration). Third, in a lognormal 
representation of the random walk model (used here both for house prices 
and stock market developments), the drift-rate (σdX ) and the implied volatil-
ity (µdt ) are equal to the mean and variance of the historical developments 
of house prices and share prices respectively. Therefore, estimation of these 
parameters is straightforward.
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Econometric and statistical results
The results of the estimation procedures of the model represented by sub-
models 1-5, as described in this chapter and appendix A are presented in 
Table 4.1. Note that, when comparing the parameters for a particular model 
across countries, one should not compare the individual parameter estimates 
on a one-to-one basis, but the whole parameter set.
Therefore, although the parameters39 of the income model appear to be 
quite different across countries, this does not necessarily imply that the ex-
pected income growth is equally different. In the UK, for instance, the best 
fit for the model appears to be high percentage households with a steady in-
come growth (note the kappa40 of ~84%) in combination with an annual, nom-
inal change in income of just over one percent. If a ‘leap’ in income occurs, it 
will bring about an expected income change of nearly 20%.
In the Netherlands, on the contrary, a relatively high percentage of house-
holds do experience a significant leap in income every year (~27%) with an ex-
pected gain of just six percent. The non-movers group experiences an annual 
income change of 1.4%. The same story could be told for other households in 
other countries; overall, households across Europe may expect an annual in-
crease in their income41.
Some additional comments need to be made on the other models. The 
same interest model was used for Belgium, France, Italy and the Nether-
lands because, since the introduction of the euro (and actually well before), 
the market interest rates have converged to a common level within the euro 
zone. Separate models were estimated for Denmark and the UK as they still 
have their own currency and monetary policy. In all the countries in the study, 
nominal house prices rose by six or seven percent (the high figures for Italy 
and the UK reflect high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s). House prices are 
highly volatile in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. In the UK this stems from 
high volatility in the short-run (falling house prices are not uncommon) while 
in the Netherlands, it is the result of a one-time bust in the housing market 
(early 1980s) and a boom at the end of the twentieth century. The estimation 
of the stock market developments is based on the AEX (Dutch stock exchange). 
39 The model was simultaneously estimated for households with a low and with a high income (below or above 
the median). For further background, see Appendix A. Note that for all households the variability of the house-
hold income is higher for the higher income groups. This is due, amongst others, to the instability of the house-
hold itself and hence its income.
40 Kappa in this model represents not only changes in socio-economic position but also – more implicitly – 
models the changes in household structures; hence the estimated kappa is substantially lower than in the Dutta 
study.
41 Partial simulation of the income model shows that expected income change in all countries is positive: the 
expected yearly real income changes are estimated for Belgium as 0.34%, Denmark 0.44%, France 0.63%, Italy 
0.04%, the Netherlands 0.53%, and for the UK 0.16%.
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Since this sub-model is only relevant for investment mortgages, which have 
a substantial share of the market only in the Netherlands, this assumption 
does not seem over-ambitious. Finally, all other data used in the model, are 
shown and discussed in Tables 3.4 to 3.7.
 4.5 First results: the costs and 
risks of a mortgage
Table 4.2 shows the costs and risks of a mortgage in the different countries. 
The calculation is based on the household characteristics of a recent buyer 
and the prevailing institutional context. Both are discussed in the previous 
[ 62 ]
Table 4.1 Estimated parameters of the interest, income, house price and stock market model
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Income model
Kappa (low income group) 0.8960 0.8550 0.8650 0.9030 0.7310 0.8380
Kappa (high income group) 0.6470 0.4650 0.6340 0.7890 0.5370 0.6210
Mean (non-mover) 0.0160 0.0050 0.0238 0.0177 0.0146 0.0103
Implied volatility (non-mover) 0.0453 0.0395 0.0280 0.0222 0.0198 0.0155
Mean (mover, log) 10.3780 10.6270 10.3510 10.0280 10.2990 10.3120
Volatility (mover, log) 0.0690 0.0550 0.1970 0.2010 0.0870 0.2650
Interest model1
Mean-reversion level 0.0390 0.0440 . . . 0.0450
Implied volatility 0.0410 0.0330 . . . 0.0460
Reversion speed 0.2395 0.2801 . . . 0.3834
Spread (av.) 0.0100 0.0070 0.0050 0.0150 0.0040 0.0110
Market price of risk -0.0358 0.0217 . . . 0.0255
House prices model
Mean 0.0657 0.0720 0.0717 0.1180 0.0749 0.1147
Implied volatility 0.0654 0.0829 0.0661 0.1663 0.1017 0.1102
Stock market model2 
Mean . . . . 0.0671 .
Implied volatility . . . . 0.2106 .
Administration costs . . . . 0.0100 .
Inflation 0.0188 0.0221 0.0180 0.0315 0.0282 0.0259
Sources: Interest rates: monthly data from 1990:1-2004:12, “1 month AIBOR/EURIBOR interest rate”, and “end month 
sterling Interbank lending rate, mean LIBID/LIBOR”. Income: annual data from 1994-2001, European Community 
Household Panel. House Prices: annual data from 1971-2002, Bank for International Settlements. Stock market: annual 
data from 1961-2002, AEX 
1. France, Italy and the Netherlands are all considered to have the same parameter set as Belgium. 
2. All countries have the same parameter set as the Netherlands.
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chapter. The mortgage contract specifications represent the typical mortgage 
(mix) chosen in a country. For instance, in Belgium the typical mortgage con-
sists of a mix of annuity and serial mortgages with a relatively long duration 
and a fixed-interest period while, in the Netherlands, it consists of a combi-
nation of investment and interest-rate-only mortgages with longer duration 
and shorter fixed-interest periods. For the sake of a genuine comparison, a 
nominal mortgage of €100,000 was used.
The expected costs of these mortgages range from €113,344 in the Nether-
lands, closely followed by Denmark, to more than €147,000 in the UK. These 
differences can be largely traced back to differences in the institutional con-
text, i.e. mortgage interest tax relief. The range between minimum and maxi-
mum (expected) costs is quite significant in the Netherlands and the UK. This 
fits in, of course, with the preference of Dutch and English homeowners for 
investment mortgages and, in the UK in particular, for mortgages with vari-
able interest rates. Both lead to greater variability in the expected mortgage 
costs. Mortgage risks can be presented in two different ways. Following on 
from the discussion in Chapter 2, mortgage risk constitutes uncertainty about 
both the future mortgage costs and the specific mortgage risk: default and 
the risk of being repossessed.
Uncertainty about expected mortgage costs is addressed in Table 4.2, pre-
sented by the standard deviation and the semi-variance (see technical note 
4.2 at the end of this chapter). The results show that the variance is moder-
ate in most countries, with the exception of the Netherlands and the UK (the 
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Table 4.2 Costs and implied risks of a typical mortgage of € 100,000 (EU6, recent buyers, 2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Expected costs (€ )
Mean 137,897 124,974 137,889 125,957 113,344 147,472
Trimmed mean 137,920 124,977 137,934 125,495 113,795 147,612
Minimum 124,631 122,198 129,283 119,681 59,624 103,787
Maximum 149,606 127,524 143,436 160,485 135,229 187,553
90%-percentile 142,488 126,011 140,645 128,757 123,180 171,051
Risks (€ )       
Standard deviation 3,570 814 2,122 3,899 8,659 19,765
Semi-variance 2,496 569 1,443 3,498 5,349 13,516
Arrears (%, annualised) -- -- 1.73 4.79 1.22 3.10
Repossession (%, annualised) -- -- 0.21 1.33 0.43 2.08
Negative equity (€ ) -- -- -- -- -- --
The expected costs of a mortgage of € 100,000 are equal to the mean of the simulated distribution of all possible 
outcomes (in net present value terms); the other variable gives some additional information on the shape of that 
distribution. The default % (and the repossession %) indicates the yearly ex-ante probability of default (or being 
repossessed). Note that these figures in this table are based on the analysis of the paradigmatic case representing the 
average borrower. Because on a micro level the correlation between mortgage take-up and income may be higher than on 
a aggregate level, these figures overestimate the default and repossession percentages.
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reasons for this discrepancy are discussed above). Secondly, Table 4.2 shows 
the risk of default (mortgage arrears), the probability of repossession, and 
ultimately, the expected negative equity. Remember that the results here 
are based on a country-specific mortgage contract with a nominal value of 
€100,000. Since the default and the repossession risk depend heavily on the 
level and changes of household income in relation to the mortgage costs, the 
absolute value of these risks are not very informative. Therefore, the discus-
sion of these issues will be delayed until after the presentation of the cost-
and-risk equivalent of actual mortgage take-up (Table 5.3).
Finally, it should be noted that the results presented here are based on 
a paradigmatic case representing the ‘average’ borrower in a country. Since 
mortgage take-up and net income differ according to household, one can ex-
pect the ratio at micro-level to be better geared than at meso-level presented 
here; hence the risks shown in Table 4.2 constitute probably a maximum.
  Technical notes to Chapter 4
Note 4.1 Random number generator
The practical value of any Monte Carlo Simulation is limited by the conver-
gence of the method, i.e. by the number of simulations that are needed to 
obtain reliable results. Standard Monte Carlo Simulation implies choosing 
randomly a series of points x1. .xn from a standard normal distribution and 
computing F(x). According to the central limit theorem, the average of the 
values of F(x1. .xn )  should converge. In the model presented in this chapter 
x1. .xn are distributed in a multidimensional space; the number of dimensions 
is equal to the number of random variables (4).
The four sub-models described in this chapter are mutually dependent, 
meaning that future developments in interest rates, income, property prices 
and the stock market are correlated. Therefore, we must correct the model 
for illogical outcomes, i.e. situations that cannot occur under normal circum-
stances. One way of doing so is to generate the different random numbers 
X1..Xn as multi-correlated. Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix between 
the four dependent variables.
To make the model more useful42, convergences must be speeded up (vari-
ance reduction). This can be achieved in several ways. One possibility is to 
make the distribution of the random numbers as similar to the standard nor-
mal distribution as possible. This is done by applying the antithetic variables 
method, which uses not only every random number drawn from the standard 
normal distribution but also the opposite. Consequently, the distribution is 
42 The number of iterations grows exponentially with the number of random variables in the model.
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completely symmetrical around zero. Another way of increasing the conver-
gence rate is to use sequences of random numbers, which are more uniformly 
spread (quasi-random numbers).
Here I used the ‘Mersenne Twister’ random number generator (version 
2.01); this module generates quasi-random numbers while applying an an-
tithetic method and correcting for multi-correlation (see Marsumoto and 
Nishimura (1998) for further details).
The empirical error was computed in order to assess the precision of the 
results and to compare the convergence of standard Monte Carlo Simulation 
with the version described above. The simulation results were divided into 
ten blocks of equal size; the standard deviation of each set of blocks was used 
as the empirical error. The results are shown in Figure 4.3 (note that the two 
methods converge when the number of iterations is higher).
For the main results presented in this chapter and the next, I used a se-
quence of N = 2,500 simulations43.
Note 4.2 Semi-variance
The most obvious and most used criterion for risk determination is the vari-
ance (or the standard deviation). Standard portfolio analysis shows that a 
unique arrangement of investment alternatives is possible in a so-called 
mean-variance framework. This applies mutatis mutandis to the mirror-im-
age issue of the costs and risks of mortgages, the subject of this study. The 
standard deviation as a criterion also implies, however, that a positive weight 
is accorded to outcomes below the mean. It may be assumed that an owner-
occupier with an aversion to risk-taking will ‘fear’ higher average mortgage 
costs and see lower mortgage costs as a bonus. Therefore, not all uncertain-
ties imply a risk (see Chapter 2). Ideally, the risk criterion should consider this. 
The semi-variance is, in that case, a good alternative (Eftekhari et al., 2000). 
The semi-variance is an asymmetric indicator and is defined as the sum of 
43 In the next chapter, I calculate and compare the costs and risks of different mortgage types, sometimes with 
just a minor effect on expected costs, default rates etcetera. In order to prevent the empirical error from exceed-
ing the expected difference of different alternative options, the number of cases must be relatively high to get 
valid results. Hence 2,500 simulations, leading to an empirical error of less than 0,5 percent.
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Table 4.3 Correlation matrix between interest rates, shares, house prices, and income 
(EU6)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Interest / shares 0.17 -0.04 0.17 0.17 0.17 -0.05
Interest / house prices -0.29 -0.50 0.24 0.29 -0.41 -0.13
Interest / income 0.38 -0.04 0.31 0.34 0.18 0.32
Shares / house prices -0.27 0.06 -0.35 -0.32 -0.25 -0.29
Shares / income -0.18 -0.05 -0.33 -0.17 0.10 -0.08
House price / income 0.17 0.00 0.66 0.46 0.32 0.29
Source: see Table 4.2
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the squared mean differences insofar as the net mortgage repayments are 
above the mean. If Ci stands for costs, while C  stands for expected costs, i.e. 
the mean of the distribution, the semi-variance sv can be computed as:
sv =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
min[0,Ci −C ]
2
[ 66 ]
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 5 Optimal mortgage choice 
and risks attitudes of 
borrowers44, 45
 5.1 Introduction
With the model designed and discussed in the previous chapter it is possible 
to calculate the expected mortgage costs and (ex-ante) risks, given the typical 
mortgage characteristics, the profile of the (prospective) borrowers and the in-
stitutional setting.
In this chapter, the model is extended to assess the risk attitude of a bor-
rower. Recapping on the discussion in Chapter 2 on the derivation of the risk 
attitude from actual behaviour, we need to be clear that it is not the stated 
attitude that matters, but the revealed attitude based on actual choice-be-
haviour. The idea is to ascertain the attitude of borrowers by comparing their 
chosen option (i.e. mortgage contracts) in terms of costs and risks, hence in-
corporating the effect of institutions and different household and mortgage 
characteristics with all the other available alternatives. This will make it pos-
sible to evaluate whether the chosen mortgage contract is optimal and to as-
certain if the borrower chooses an option with a low or high-risk profile.
This chapter starts by explaining the methodology (Section 5.2). In Section 
5.3, the focus shifts to the costs and risks of the different options within each 
country. Finally, in Section 5.4, the prevailing risk attitudes of borrowers, sub-
divided into various categories, are identified and discussed.
 5.2 Measuring risk attitudes
Figure 5.1 depicts three steps, which demonstrate how the risk attitude is 
measured in this thesis. First, the costs and risks – the semi-variance – for the 
entire range of mortgage contracts on offer on the market are calculated with 
the model described in the previous chapter. Once calculated, the results in 
terms of costs and risks embody the relevant institutional context and differ-
ences in household characteristics.
It is easily seen from Figure 5.1 (top figure) that some options represent 
lower costs or lower risks, or both.
An option (mortgage contract) is considered inefficient if other options are 
available, that offer both lower costs and lower risks. If this is not the case, 
the original option is regarded as efficient. The efficient options are the ones a 
rational decision-maker should choose. In Figure 5.1 (second drawing), a line, 
called the ‘efficiency frontier’, visualises these efficient options. Note that the 
44 Some of the more technical details are left out of the core text of this chapter; these issues are added, as an 
appendix (technical note), at the end of this chapter.
45 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Neuteboom (2005).
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exact shape of the efficiency-frontier is dependent on the product range avail-
able. In the lowest Figure, this efficiency frontier is broken down within the 
range of lowest costs – lowest risks (see technical note 5.1 at the end of this 
chapter for the derivation of the efficiency frontier). The risk attitude is sim-
ply derived from the efficiency frontier, i.e. it is equal to the slope of the curve 
tangent to the chosen option.
[ 68 ]
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In the real world, not every borrower will choose an option on the effi-
ciency frontier; perhaps caused by unawareness of the option or because the 
transaction costs for altering the mortgage contract are too high46. The dis-
tance between the chosen option and the nearest option on the efficiency 
frontier is a measurement of inefficiency, i.e. an indicator of how much is to 
be gained if an option is chosen on the efficiency frontier47.
To illustrate this point, the last drawing in Figure 5.1 is replicated and ex-
panded in Figure 5.2. Here, option A lies on the efficiency frontier F(x); so, 
by definition, the choice is optimal. The risk attitude in this case is equal to 
F'(xa ). However, what happens if the borrower chooses option B? Clearly, this 
option is inefficient (suboptimal) since F(xb )  ≠  yb. In this case, the risk atti-
tude of the borrower can be derived by transposing point B to a fictitious point 
B' on F(x), i.e. a linear transformation so that yb – z =  F(xb – z  ). Then the risk 
attitude can be easily derived as F'(xb – z  ). The proportion z can be used to 
measure the extent of the inefficiency (see also technical note 5.2 at the end 
of this chapter).
 5.3 An assessment of the costs and risks of 
different mortgages and their alternatives
This section assesses the costs and risks of different mortgages and their al-
ternatives. Although most mortgage contracts are now available in all six Eu-
ropean countries (see Section 3.5), this does not necessarily imply that they 
are available to all customers. Certainly, in Southern European countries, in-
vestment and interest-only mortgages are available only to a limited extent 
for the average borrower. Hence, they are eliminated from the set of available 
options in these countries. On the other hand, credit constraints imposed on 
borrowers (i.e. the debt-service ratio should remain below 35%) mean that in 
high-lending countries (e.g. the Netherlands and the UK) serial loans is not an 
option either (see discussion in Section 3.5).
Table 5.1 sums up the different mortgage products, which were used in 
the consecutive analysis. It shows a combination of five mortgage types (the 
serial and annuity mortgage, the savings and investment mortgage and the 
interest-only mortgage), a short or long duration (20 and 30 years respective-
ly), and three different fixed-interest periods (monthly interest rates, 10-year 
variable and 20/30-years fixed); altogether 30 combinations.
46 Therefore, not every new mortgage contract innovation will gain immediate support, nor do people respond 
to changes in their personal circumstances (a new job, household dissolution, etc.) by remortgaging.
47 Note that small inefficiencies can last quite long given the costs of remortgaging. Hence, we can expect inef-
ficiencies to be lower for recent buyers than for non-movers.
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In the remainder of this section, first, the cost-and-risk equivalent of actu-
al mortgage take-up is discussed, followed by a presentation of the costs and 
risks of all available alternative mortgage contracts. Note that the analysis in 
this section focuses on recent buyers only.
Actual choice: mix of different mortgage types
Table 5.2 presents the actual costs and risks for recent buyers (the table is 
comparable with Table 4.2). These figures show the actual expected costs 
and some risk measurement for the average recent buyers in the different 
countries. In contrast with the results in Table 4.2 – based on a mortgage of 
€100,000 – the results here are based on exact amount households actually 
take-up (see last row).
Clearly, the costs and risks of actual mortgage take-up vary considerably 
between countries. Denmark is in the lead, followed closely by the Nether-
lands, while Belgium and Italy lag behind. After the discussion on mortgage 
take-up (Section 3.2), these results are not surprising. However, the transla-
tion of outstanding mortgages to net expected costs is not simply a linear 
transformation.
Institutions, homeowners and mortgage contracts differ, all affecting the 
actual costs (and risks) that a mortgage implies for the individual borrower. 
The ratio of mortgage take-up to the net costs-equivalent varies from 1.10 in 
the Netherlands to 1.37 in Belgium and France. The costs are relatively high 
in Belgium and France, given the preference for more traditional mortgages 
(serial/annuity, short duration, and long fixed-interest periods). Modern mort-
gages and a favourable mortgage interest tax relief system lead to a low level 
of expected costs for Dutch homeowners. As always, however, low costs come 
with a disadvantage: more risks.
The uncertainty regarding future costs is somewhat low for traditional 
mortgages; certainly if combined with long fixed-interest periods, which 
eliminate all interest rate risks. This can be clearly illustrated by comparing 
the risks (semi-variance) over the six countries. The risks in the UK are espe-
cially high due to preferences for the riskier/more uncertain mortgage types 
and short fixed-interest periods. Naturally, these risks also depend on actual 
mortgage take-up.
Secondly, the risk of mortgages can be dealt with in terms of default and 
repossession risks, which are also shown in Table 5.2. Only in France, the 
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Table 5.1 Assessment categories
Mortgage type Duration Fixed interest period
Serial mortgage• 30 years• Fixed• 
Annuity mortgage• 20 years• 10 years• 
Savings mortgage• Variable• 
Investment mortgage• 
Interest-only mortgage• 
Actual choice: combination of different types (see Table 3.4 for an overview)
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Netherlands and the UK are these risks significant48. These results partly re-
flect differences in mortgage take-up and partly the higher volatility in in-
come in these countries. The probability that arrears will end in repossession 
is even smaller (repossession may be compulsory or voluntary, see Section 
4.4). Here, legislation and regulation also play an important role; in some 
countries, such as France, where strong consumer protection laws lead to long 
foreclosure procedures, the probability is virtually non-existent (the opposite 
applies in the UK). Finally, the probability of negative equity – occurring only 
when house prices fall below the outstanding mortgage at the time of repos-
session – is more or less negligible49, except in the Netherlands. This stems, of 
course, from the definition of negative equity, i.e. conditional on repossession, 
house price volatility and the net outstanding mortgages.
The default and repossession risks shown in Table 5.2 are annualised per-
centages. In reality, both risks show a distinct pattern over time: High in the 
first years50 after taken out the mortgage and then rapidly declining thereaf-
ter, when positive income changes and repaying the initial debt diminish the 
probability of any payment problems. As example, in Figure 5.3 the default 
and repossession probabilities over time for the Netherlands are shown; again 
for the paradigmatic case representing the average recent buyer.
48 Note again, that these figures relate to recent buyers only. Data on arrears as presented in Table 3.7 refers to 
all borrowers/buyers; hence considerably lower than in Table 5.2.
49 Risk indicators are not necessarily proportional to the initial mortgage take-up.
50 Lending criteria of financial institutions will prevent arrears occurring within the first years.
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Table 5.2 Costs and implied risk of actual mortgage take-up (recent buyers, EU6, 2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Costs (€ )
Mean 95,549 228,566 144,061 81,582 214,767 164,324
Trimmed mean 95,577 228,718 144,106 81,553 214,957 163,215
Minimum 86,129 216,422 136,021 78,108 133,526 130,105
Maximum 102,991 233,558 150,453 86,170 250,116 224,113
90%-percentile 98,519 230,670 146,765 83,215 227,888 195,053
Risks (€)       
Standard-deviation 2,420 2,218 2,202 1,238 10,499 20,062
Semi-variance 1,667 1,148 1,489 ,922 7,062 15,952
Arrears (%, annualised) -- 0.11 2.21 0.56 2.92 3.79
Repossession (%, annualised) -- 0.01 0.34 0.01 1.42 3.26
Negative equity (€ ) -- -- -- -- -15.47* --
Initial mortgage take-up (€ ) 69,291 182,937 104,439 65,352 194,982 123,642
Source: see Table 4.2
* The average negative equity when a household is repossessed (or ‘voluntary’ forced to move) amounts up to ~€ 13,500.
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Costs51 and risks of all available mortgages
Next, Figure 5.4 depicts the costs and risks of all available mortgage contracts, 
i.e. the costs and risks of each of the 30 combinations defined in Table 5.2. Only 
the mortgage contract specifications were altered in the analysis, not the char-
acteristics of the individual borrower or the amount actually taken up. Note that 
in some countries, see discussion in Chapter 3, not all mortgage types are avail-
able or that borrowers’ accessibility is hampered (Section 3.5). Obviously, these 
mortgage supply restrictions limit the range of the options available to the bor-
rower. However, for the derivation of the implied risk attitude of borrowers the 
lack of options is not important. Of course, choice behaviour of borrowers is not 
influenced by the set of mortgage contract options outside their scope.
The first and foremost conclusion to derive from Figure 5.4 is that actual 
mortgage take-up of recent buyers can be considered rational and optimal; 
i.e. the chosen option constitute a cost/risk trade-off on or near the efficien-
cy frontier. Next, although the pattern of costs and risks diverges for the dif-
ferent mortgages between countries, some general conclusions can still be 
drawn. One might expect investment mortgages, with their additional uncer-
tainty about share price developments, and mortgages with more variable in-
terest rates to bring more risks than other mortgage types, but this does not 
always hold true: it actually depends on both the institutional context and the 
economic cycle. So for instance, if long-term inflation is higher (e.g. the UK52 ), 
variable interest rates lead to lower costs and lower risks in the end. Similarly, 
if the correlation between interest rates and share prices is negative (again, in 
the UK) the mix of variable interest and investment can be profitable, particu-
51 These costs include the capitalised risk in case of arrear and repossession.
52 See also mortgage take-up in the past in Italy; given the high inflation, half the borrowers opted for variable 
interest rates.
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larly if the mortgage period is modest. In Belgium, on the other hand, with a 
tax system that favours repayment, serial and annuity mortgages are much 
less costly, particularly if the mortgage period is relatively short. Households 
in Belgium would be even better off if they were to abandon their tradition-
al preference for long-term fixed-interest periods. Other countries, of course, 
have their own characteristics when it comes to institutions, economic cycles, 
borrowers, and factors that affect the optimal mortgage choice. Therefore, the 
trade-off between (higher) costs and (added) risks differs in each case.
Finally, a partial analysis – here exclusively for recent buyers in the Neth-
erlands – is presented in Appendix B, showing how optimal choices change 
under different conditions (see also Neuteboom, 2005). This analysis shows 
along other lines the way in which institutions may shape the outcomes on 
the mortgage market.
 5.4 Risk attitudes of borrowers in a 
cross-country framework
Before presenting and discussing the risk attitudes of recent buyers and other 
groups, a few words need to be said about the relationship between risks, risk 
attitudes and mortgage take-up.
Many treat mortgage take-up as synonymous with risks (see the discus-
sion in Chapter 1), but does the actual mortgage debt taken up by a home-
owner really matter? The obvious answer seems to be ‘yes’, but this answer is 
certainly not always true. In fact, it is more wrong than right. Recall the dis-
cussion on the concept of risk and risk attitude in Chapter 2, which finished 
off with the statement that risk is a combination of hazards, probabilities and 
impact (consequences). Obviously, neither hazards nor probabilities depend 
on actual mortgage take-up. The consequences do; but households adopt dif-
ferent strategies to prevent them. The first and most plausible strategy is not 
to borrow to their limits; for some, this means either postponing the purchase 
of a house altogether or accepting one of lesser quality. By way of illustration, 
see Figure 5.5, which shows the maximum borrowing capacity53 for recent 
buyers and first-time buyers in comparison with actual mortgage take-up.
Although differences exist across the countries, it is clear that recent buy-
ers mostly do not go for the maximum. Generally, they remain below the 75% 
mark; i.e. their actual loan is in percentage of actual mortgage take-up 75% or 
53 The maximum borrowing capacity is calculated with the household characteristics of recent buyers (income), 
the prevailing system of housing provision, mortgage interest rates, typical mortgage characteristics and, finally, 
the credit constraints (maximum debt service ratio allowed).
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less. Here, Belgium homeowners being the most cautious, using, on average, 
slightly less than 40% of the maximum borrowing capacity; buying a relative 
cheap house is the main contributor, family loans and/or personal savings 
make up the difference. This lending behaviour effectively creates a buffer 
for a drop of 25% in household income or a rise of one third in the housing 
costs (when actual borrowing is restricted to 75% of the maximum). Over time, 
when the income increases and the outstanding mortgage debt decreases54 
these margins improve further. The average buyer, however, is not credit con-
straint; i.e. he is not necessarily a short-term cost minimiser but his utility 
depends on minimising both costs and risks.
The results (Figure 5.5) show that first-time buyers differ (slightly) from 
other recent buyers (lending less, but actual take-up is closer to their maxi-
mum borrowing capacity!); although it is fair to say that lenders assessment 
procedures play the more decisive role here. Since lenders focus with this 
group primarily on the loan-to-value ratio, low loan-to-income ratios for first-
time buyers indicate that the credit-constraints are more based on lack of 
necessary savings (i.e. initial down payment) than on household income.
Risk attitudes, the core issue of this thesis, do not depend directly on the 
54 Actually, this rate depends on the chosen mortgage contract.
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amount of outstanding mortgage debt either. Households in some countries 
do borrow substantially more than in others in terms of loan-to-income ratio 
– which will increase the potential negative consequences for them. However, 
the argument here is that these outcomes are merely a reflection of the pre-
vailing conditions on the national housing market (house price level, rental 
market, quality, locational aspects, etcetera), and are not a sign of greater hous-
ing consumption whilst accepting higher risks55. Risk attitudes, i.e. the prefer-
ence of borrowers for mortgage products with relatively lower or higher risks, 
depend solely on the choice from the range of available mortgage contracts, all 
of which are within the means of the borrower. Naturally, in the short and long 
run, the risk profile differs for the various mortgage contracts, but this is capi-
talised in the initial cost and risk assessment when the loan is taken out.
The resulting risk attitudes and inefficiency measurement for recent buy-
ers are presented in Table 5.3. First, the estimated parameters of the efficiency 
frontier are shown, next the actual risk attitude and inefficiency measure-
ment (see technical note 5.2 at the end of this chapter) for the exact deriva-
tion of these indicators). Recall, once again, that the analysis here is based on 
a paradigmatic case representing the ‘average’ recent buyer in a country.
The following conclusions may be drawn from the results reported in Table 
5.3:
Recent buyers in all countries are risk-averse, i.e. the coefficient is between  ■
–1 and 0. Hence, they choose options with relatively low risks and high-ex-
pected costs.
With the exception of borrowers in the UK, the differences between coun- ■
tries (for recent buyers) are small. Households in the UK do opt for more 
risk-inclined mortgages, but still even, they are risk averse.
In most countries, the inefficiency indicator is rather low, indicating that  ■
households (recent buyers) make the optimal choice (behave rationally), i.e. 
they choose an option on the efficiency frontier, given their personal back-
ground and current institutional context. Of course, the range of mortgage 
products on offer on the market also influences the optimal mortgage. If, 
like in for instance France and Italy, the options are for most households 
limited and did not alter over time, the efficiency of the choice is secured.
At first glance, households in the Netherlands and the UK seem to have  ■
relatively high inefficiency measurements (6.2288 and 4.8107 respective-
ly), i.e. they could choose an option closer to the efficiency frontier (than 
the one actually chosen). The potential benefits – which constitute up to 
€4,404 (NL) and €3,402 (UK) in terms of lower costs and risks over the full 
duration of the mortgage –, are relativity small compared to the initial out-
55 In fact, there is no hard evidence that households in high-lending countries consume more housing services 
(in terms of size, dwelling type, etc.) than elsewhere in Europe.
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standing mortgage debt56. Note also that the huge, and increasing, number 
of products households in these countries may choose from, made it in-
creasingly difficult for households to make a well-informed decision (i.e. 
information and search costs are high!).
The focus in the remainder of this section will be on the differences and simi-
larities in risk attitude in different household categories. Figure 5.6 shows the 
results for three different groups of households, based on age, income and 
housing market position. The ranking between countries, as shown in Table 
5.4, does not change if the focus shifts to different household categories. Nev-
ertheless, some general conclusions can be drawn (here recent buyers are 
used as a benchmark):
All households are risk-averse, even when focusing on the different groups.  ■
Borrowers in the UK are in the lead, but even they can be considered risk-
averse.
If house prices and volatility in house prices are higher – e.g. the Nether- ■
lands and the UK – first-time buyers have to accept a higher risk in order 
succeeding on the homeownership market. In general, the ‘all borrowers’-
group is slightly more risk-averse than recent buyers are. Given their pro-
file (see Chapter 3), this outcome is not unexpected.
Low-income buyers (1st quintile) across Europe tend to be more risk-averse  ■
than others are. Given their income level and lack of resources to over-
come any temporary financial problem, this is only to be expected. How-
ever, Danish and Dutch borrowers with a lower income accept relatively 
more risks. The prospects of home equity, fuelled by recent house price in-
creases, in combination with a good safety net if things go wrong, prompt 
them to take on higher risks57. Conversely, high(er)-income households (3rd 
quintile) have average risk attitudes, with the exception of the UK58.
56 Note also that in these countries the number of mortgage products is high and still increasing, meaning that 
it is not always feasible for individual customers to make the optimal mortgage choice.
57 I.e. they consider homeownership as less risky than other groups (Turner et al., 2006); a notion that is not 
necessarily valid.
58 In the UK, households in the fourth quintile, push up the average.
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Table 5.3 Risk attitudes and rational choice behaviour of recent buyers (EU6, 2003)
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Efficiency frontier (y = αe βx)
α 5.3800 5,846.2000 14.5200 88.9600 198.2900 1,192.5000
β -0.0195 -0.0365 -0.0140 -0.0568 -0.0205 -0.0283
Risk attitude -0.0196 -0.0504 -0.0287 -0.0498 -0.0547 -0.3555
Inefficiency measurement 1.1569 0.3287 0.6102 0.0777 6.2288 4.8107
The risk attitude is always below zero, given the negative trade-off between lower risk and higher expected costs. If the 
risk attitude is equal to -1, the decision-maker (borrower) is considered risk-neutral; if the risk attitude is between -1 and 
0, he is considered risk-averse. Finally, if the risk attitude is lower than -1, he is considered a risk-seeker. The inefficiency 
frontier, an indicator of rational behaviour, is proportional to initial mortgage take-up.
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Younger households (< 30 years), mostly first-time buyers, are willing to  ■
accept higher costs and risks to succeed on the housing market, although 
the differences, with the exception of UK households, are not high. On the 
other hand, older households, with a profile comparable with all borrowers 
are more risk-averse. So apparently, younger cohorts have different risk at-
titudes than older cohorts59.
Finally, although not shown in Figure 5.5, the inefficiency measurement for  ■
the different household categories indicates, as expected, that the more time 
has passed since choosing the mortgage, the greater the inefficiency, thereby 
indicating that transaction and search costs are relatively high and that bor-
rowers do not attempt to optimise their mortgage immediately. On the other 
59 However, it is not always easy to disentangle choice behaviour from ‘forced shopping’.
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hand, the absolute benefit the average household potentially can acquire is 
very limited (see the discussion on the risk attitudes of recent buyers).
 5.5 Conclusions
In general, the households in the sample choose rational; i.e. they choose a 
mortgage that constitutes both the lowest costs and risks. At the same time, 
the typical mortgage contract specifications – in terms of mortgage type, du-
ration, fixed interest rate period etc. – differs across countries. These, at first 
sight, contrasting results highlight the importance of both the institutional 
context and the differences in households’ characteristics in shaping the op-
timal mortgage contract for households. Next, all recent buyers in the differ-
ent countries express a risk-averse attitude towards mortgages, as one may 
expect given the high financial commitment at stake. Zooming in on different 
household categories – by age, income or housing market position – did not 
alter this view.
Thus, given the results of the analysis, what can we conclude with respect 
to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1:
Households behave rational when choosing a specific mortgage type; i.e. they I. 
choose a mortgage that constitute, for them, the lowest costs and/or risks.
The risk attitude of owner-occupiers with similar individual characteristics is iden-II. 
tical across countries when adjusted for differences in institutions and the struc-
ture of national mortgage markets.
The results presented earlier in this chapter confirmed the first hypothesis. I.e. 
the inefficiency measurement is close to zero (z ≈	0 ) for all countries. House-
holds do choose optimal, given their personal (socio-economic) circumstanc-
es, the institutional context and the structure of the national mortgage mar-
ket. I.e. the implicit assumption of rational behaviour seems to be valid.
Two versions of the second hypothesis were discussed. In the weak ver-
sion of the hypothesis, the expectation was that all households in the differ-
ent countries are revealing a risk-averse attitude towards mortgages; while in 
the strong version of the hypothesis no significant differences in the risk atti-
tude of owner-occupiers with similar individual characteristics exist between 
countries, i.e.
H0,weak :  ∀  countries a..n F’(x)  country < 0
H0,strong :  ∀  countries a..n F’(x)  country = a  = . . . . = F’(x) country = n < 0
In Table 5.4, the risk attitudes for different categories are presented, includ-
ing some test statistics showing whether the outcome in one country is sig-
nificantly different from the median. A sign test, based on the median is here 
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more appropriate given the non normal distribution of the risk attitudes 
across countries (households in the UK seem to be outliers).
Clearly, in all countries, for all household categories – not just recent buy-
ers – the risk attitude is between –1 and 0 indicating risk-averseness, so the 
weak hypothesis is confirmed. However, UK households in all categories ex-
hibit significantly less risk-averseness than comparable household categories 
in other countries; the differences between households in the other five coun-
tries are insignificant. So, the stronger version of the hypothesis H0,strong must 
be rejected.
Further research will demonstrate whether these differences – between 
the UK and the other countries – are just temporal phenomena reflecting 
prevailing conditions or are more persistent showing different risk attitudes 
based on cultural traditions.
  Technical notes to Chapter 5
Note 5.1 Derivation of the efficiency frontier
Suppose someone chooses option A, represented in the diagram below (Figure 
5.7) by the midpoint of the intersecting lines.
An option is considered as (possibly) lying on the efficiency frontier if there 
are no alternatives in the southwest quadrant, marked ‘Efficient options’. On 
the other hand, any option in the northeast quadrant is inefficient for a bor-
rower, since there is at least one option available, mortgage choice A, which 
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Table 5.4 Testing the hypothesis: risk attitudes of borrowers across countries and household categories
Housing market position Income Age
Recent buyer
First-time 
buyer All borrowers Low High Young Old
Belgium -0.0196 -0.0199 -0.0212 -0.0195 -0.0196 -0.0199 -0.0206
Denmark -0.0503 -0.0539 -0.0451 -0.0934 -0.0498 -0.0532 -0.0463
France -0.0287 -0.0287 -0.0320 -0.0157 -0.0289 -0.0286 -0.0322
Italy -0.0498 -0.0498 -0.0576 -0.0007 -0.0498 -0.0495 -0.0599
Netherlands -0.0547 -0.0555 -0.0440 -0.0859 -0.0521 -0.0524 -0.0447
UK -0.3554 -0.3500 -0.2302 -0.1231 -0.2578 -0.3261 -0.1487
Median -0.0501 -0.0519 -0.0446 -0.0527 -0.0498 -0.0510 -0.0455
Median-test  
95%-confidence interval
Lower -0.1858 -0.1850 -0.1272 -0.1059 -0.1442 -0.1741 -0.0939
Upper 0.0856 0.0812 0.0379 0.0004 0.0445 0.0721 0.0028
This table shows risk attitudes by country and household category. To compare means a simple sign-test was performed; 
the lower and upper value of the 95%-confidence interval is shown at the bottom two rows. Dark shading indicates that 
the country/household categories’ risk attitude is below the lower bound. See also the note on Figure 5.6.
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implies both lower costs and risks60. Hence, these options cannot be on the 
efficiency frontier either. Thirdly, it is not easy to assess whether any options 
in the southeast or northwest quadrant are on the efficiency frontier as this 
depends on the exact shape of the efficiency frontier.
Two steps are needed to establish the exact shape of the efficiency frontier 
F(x) :
Possible points on the efficiency frontier are selected by applying two sim- ■
ple rules:
Choose the options with minimum costs and minimum risks.1. 
Add to those any options that comply with: 2. ∀ i  = 1. .30  (c i > 
~c ∨ r i > 
~r ) 
(i.e. no options in the southwest quadrant).
The efficiency frontier is estimated based on this selected set and will have  ■
an exponential form of F(x) = αe βx, with β  < 0.
Note 5.2 Derivation of risk attitude and inefficiency measurement
It has already been established that if someone chooses option A on the ef-
ficiency frontier F(x), his choice is by definition optimal. The risk attitude 
shows us the trade-off between the risks and costs that a borrower is willing 
to accept: in other words, the increase in expected costs that someone is will-
ing to pay in order to reduce the risk by one unit. The risk attitude is, in this 
case, equal to F'(x), i.e. the slope of a line tangent to point A. Hence, given the 
shape of the relevant part of the efficiency frontier, the first derivative, the 
risk attitude equals: F'(x) = β (α+1 )e βx. Risk attitudes are normally negative; a 
higher level – closer to zero – indicates more risk aversion.
60 This normative approach is based on a rational decision-maker and, implicitly, on a decision-maker with full 
knowledge and low transaction costs so that he can adjust his past choices quickly to changing circumstances.
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If, for whatever reason, a borrower chooses an inefficient option B, or 
– more likely – his actual choice shifts over time to an inefficient sub-optimal 
position, the risk attitude is not readily calculable. If, however, we assume that 
the shape of the efficiency frontier has not changed over time61, it is possible 
to transpose the chosen option to a point on F(x), i.e. a linear transformation, 
so that yb–z=F(xb–z). Then the risk attitude can be derived as F’(xb–z).
Finally, The proportion z  can be used to measure the extent of the ineffi-
ciency, i.e. the distance between B and B’ is by definition: √2z2.
61 This assumption implies that no fundamental break occurred in the institutional context, since the moment 
the individual household had chosen its mortgage.
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 6 Facts, findings and 
conclusions
 6.1 Summary
Homeownership in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe is increasing-
ly popular and growing. As most (prospective) homeowners are unable to fi-
nance the purchase of their property from their own resources, one can ex-
pect an increase in mortgage take-up. Recent growth brought outstanding 
mortgage debt to an astonishing €5.1 trillion (EU15, 2005), representing over 
40% of all outstanding bank credits and equal to more than one third of the 
joint GDP. Mortgage debt within Europe differs both on a macro and on a mi-
cro level.
This growing outstanding mortgage debt is a concern to the financial au-
thorities, in both the Netherlands and elsewhere. Explicitly, a growing mortgage 
debt is seen a good indicator of the risks involved for households, the financial 
sector and the state. More implicitly, the pattern of mortgage take-up is consid-
ered symptomatic of the underlying risk attitude of homeowners and borrow-
ers; hence, a high debt suggests a more risk-seeking attitude and vice-versa.
In this thesis, both notions are challenged. Mortgage risks are complex and 
multiple, depending on the institutional context and the characteristics of the 
borrowers and mortgage contracts. Taking out a mortgage is also a long-term 
financial commitment for a household. Circumstances can, and do, alter over 
time (e.g. interest rates, income, house prices, inflation) and influence both 
the expected costs and risks.
This thesis was organised along five research questions (Chapter 1). I will 
present the remainder of this summary with reference to those questions.
Research question 1 – How, and to what extent, does mortgage take-up vary in Eu-
rope, and to what extent does the relevant context within Europe diverge?
As it turns out, it is not easy to sketch a clear picture, let alone a ranking-or-
der of the different countries, based on mortgage take-up, institutional differ-
ences and similarities, characteristics of (prospective) homeowners and na-
tional mortgage markets. In terms of mortgage take-up it was indeed possible 
to categorise high debt countries (Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK) and 
low debt countries (Belgium, France, Italy), both on a macro and micro lev-
el. In terms of institutional differences, characteristics of borrowers and the 
typical mortgage contracts on offer, no clear picture emerged. Countries do 
all have their own set of long standing institutions – like the much-quoted 
mortgage interest tax relief, but also a wide range of other issues, such as 
consumer protection regulation (e.g. procedures surrounding repossessions) 
and the level of social security (unemployment benefit, pensions, etc.) – shap-
ing both demand and supply on national mortgage markets. Some evidence 
on convergence was found, but national differences are well grounded in poli-
cies, laws, and public opinion. Their partial effects were found to be both sub-
stantive as different across the EU6; their implications in terms of costs and 
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risks for individual homeowners remain obscure. These issues were more ex-
tensively discussed in Chapter 3.
Research question 2 – How can the expected costs and risks of a mortgage be quanti-
fied for an owner-occupier?
Given the multiple nature of the risks and the dynamics involved, transforming 
mortgage take-up into the costs and risks of mortgages for owner-occupiers is 
a complicated affair; all the more so in a cross-country framework. Without a 
common denominator, it would be impossible to identify, compare (or resolve) 
different risks. Therefore, if we are to draw any conclusions on the risks that 
homeowners are apparently willing to take, we should not concentrate on mort-
gage take-up itself but on the net costs and risks it represents to the borrower.
Actual costs and risks are time depending (up to 30 years). In order to cope 
with that, in this thesis a stochastic model was built in which the determin-
ing factors (e.g. income, interest rates) and the institutional context, mortgage 
market and household characteristics were combined to calculate expected 
costs and risks (including default, repossession and negative equity risk). 
These issues were more extensively discussed in Chapter 4.
Research question 3 – How can this framework be extended to compare the risk at-
titude of borrowers across countries?
That model was then extended to assess the risk attitude of a borrower. Re-
capping on the discussion in Chapter 2 on the derivation of the risk attitude 
from actual behaviour, we need to be clear that it is not so much the stat-
ed attitude that matters, but primarily the revealed attitude based on actu-
al choice-behaviour. The idea was to ascertain the attitude of borrowers by 
comparing their chosen option (i.e. mortgage contracts) in terms of costs and 
risks, hence incorporating the effect of institutions and different household 
and mortgage characteristics, with all alternative options on the market. This 
will make it possible to evaluate whether the chosen mortgage contract is op-
timal and to ascertain how far the borrower chooses an option with a low or 
high-risk profile. These issues were more extensively discussed in Chapter 4.
Research question 4 – Do households, on average, choose the optimal mortgage, i.e. 
act rationally?
Research question 5 – To what extent does the risk attitude of homogeneous groups of 
owner-occupiers differ between countries within Europe?
The results show that the cost-and-risk equivalents of mortgages differ sub-
stantially across Europe (EU6), potentially mounting to a 34% difference be-
tween low-cost and high-cost countries. Not surprisingly, the results also indi-
cate that, given the institutional context and the characteristics of borrowers, 
the optimal mortgage contract differs across countries. For instance, in the 
Netherlands an interest-only mortgage is less risky than a serial loan, while 
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the opposite is true in Belgium.
Nevertheless, households do make – more or less – an optimal choice 
and opt for the mortgage contracts with the lowest costs and risks trade-off. 
Households do choose rational, given their personal (socio-economic) circum-
stances, the institutional context and the structure of the national mortgage 
market. Therefore, differences in outcome across countries are not an indica-
tor of different behaviour of borrowers.
In terms of risk attitude, the analysis showed that borrowers in all coun-
ties are risk-averse. However, households in the UK seem to accept more risks 
than households in other countries, but even they still behave in a risk-averse 
manner. Further analysis for different groups in a country (e.g. first-time buy-
ers, low-income households) did not reveal wide deviations from this pattern.
Both research questions 4 and 5 were more extensively discussed in Chap-
ter 5.
 6.2 Discussion of findings
This section deals with two issues. First, the return to the hypothesis: did the 
research confirm or reject the hypothesis? Second, how do the results from 
this study relate to findings from other projects and perspectives?
Testing the hypotheses
This study started with the following two hypotheses (Chapter 1):
I. Households behave rational when choosing a specific mortgage type; i.e. they choose 
a mortgage that constitute, for them, the lowest costs and/or risks.
II. The risk attitude of owner-occupiers with similar individual characteristics is iden-
tical across countries when adjusted for differences in institutions and the structure 
of national mortgage markets.
Both hypotheses were confirmed. Households do act rationally (the inefficien-
cy measurement is close to zero). Therefore, one may conclude that ration-
al choice theory – though often attacked on grounds of unrealism in actual 
decision-making behaviour of households – holds, when applied to the risk 
attitudes of borrowers. The weak version of the second hypothesis – i.e. all 
households in the different countries are revealing a risk-averse attitude to-
wards mortgages – was confirmed as well. However, the strong version of the 
hypothesis – no significant differences in the risk attitude of owner-occupiers 
with similar individual characteristics exist between countries – needs to be 
rejected. Specifically households in the UK turned out to be less risk averse 
than those in other countries.
Hence, different outcomes in mortgage take-up across Europe do not neces-
sarily reflect differences in risk attitude, but merely differences in the under-
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lying institutional context, household characteristics and the available mort-
gage contracts. This thesis highlighted the important role these factors play in 
shaping the optimal mortgage choice for individual borrowers across Europe.
The starting point of this study was the observation that many – financial 
authorities, policy-makers and academics alike – interpret cross-country dif-
ferences in mortgage take-up as indications of differences in the underlying 
risk behaviour of individual households. There are two problems with linking 
macro indicators on mortgage take-up with the underlying risk attitudes; one 
is empirical, the other conceptual.
The empirical issue has been dealt with above. The conceptual problem is 
well known as the ecological fallacy, i.e. interpreting aggregated data on an in-
dividual level. The analysis of this thesis reveals that formulating conclusions 
on household behaviour by analysing the data on a cross-country level does 
not hold either. In other words, the analysis showed that the correlation be-
tween mortgage take-up on a macro level and the underlying risk attitudes is 
rather weak. Careful quantification on a micro level is needed to identify the 
true risk attitudes of borrowers; not because such an analysis (re)discovered 
unknown or neglected hazards (= origins of risks), but because the probability 
of these hazards and the consequences are hard to assess if not quantified. 
Explicit quantification, as performed in this thesis, leads to more objective 
and hence more transparent results. More generally, there is still a need to 
shift the focus of international comparative research from descriptive analy-
sis with some basic macro indicators added, to a higher level: i.e. “to quantify 
the features of national systems in a consistent fashion” (Oxley, 2001). More cross-
country studies on a micro level are needed to improve our understanding of 
(national) housing systems.
Confronting the constructivist approach
The risk attitudes (of mortgagees) can be analysed in different ways. In Chap-
ter 2, two different strands of research were discussed: the realist versus the 
constructivist approach (Jasonoff, 1998). Although, this thesis followed the 
realist approach, which implicitly assumes that all risks are quantifiable and 
that rational decision-makers decide accordingly, it would be of interest to 
see how these results hold to a constructivist approach.
The constructivists approach, with its emphasis on stated risk perceptions62 
is within the context of mortgage decision making a relatively new research ar-
ea. Recent research brought in some interesting observations (e.g. OSIS project, 
see Horsewood and Neuteboom, 2006 and Elsinga et al., 200763 for an overview).
62 One problem with stated preferences is, of course, the ex-post rationalisation of initial decision making.
63 These research results were partly based on in dept interviews amongst homeowners and renters in eight 
countries. These interviews focused on household perceptions’ of security and insecurity.
[ 86 ]
SUA021.indb   86 14-08-2008   17:51:37
Firstly, the risk awareness of households is rather low, i.e. many people are 
unaware of the (many) risks of homeownership: “Overall, most respondents rec-
ognised few risks to their housing when first asked the question. … homeowners did 
not perceive many housing related risks” (Quilgars and Jones, 2007, p. 279) and “In-
terviewees were asked what risks might affect their housing situation. It was striking 
that people were initially unsure as to how to answer this question” (Toussaint and 
Elsinga, 2007a, p. 190). Secondly, most households are quite positive about the 
future, i.e. their risk perception is rather low: “.. risks were perceived as unlikely 
to happen; moreover, people trusted their capabilities and resources to solve problems 
if they showed up” (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2007b, p. 289). Moreover, when things 
would take a turn for the worse, many people – rightfully or wrongly – rely on 
family support and social institutions to help them when necessary. Respond-
ents in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands commonly mentioned re-
liance on social security; while households in Portugal and the UK were not 
quite as sure about the role of national government, and relied more on fam-
ily support respectively self-management. Thirdly, across Europe, households 
perceive homeownership as an important aspect of life. Most households re-
ceive a sense of security of owning their own property; both in financial terms 
(when repaid, low housing costs remain) and for more ontological reasons. In 
that respect, households do not want to risk their home with financial (mort-
gage) products regarded, by them, as “risky”.
Therefore, these results do not appear to contradict the main conclusion of 
the thesis: borrowers across Europe are mostly risk-averse, irrespective of age, 
income or household type (not withstanding the fact that many households 
do not assess their risk adequately!).
Then, buying a home and certainly mastering the financial details prove 
for many households across Europe a difficult task. That is, understand-
ing the uncertainties involved and assessing them accurately is a necessity 
well beyond the potential for many. On the other hand, it is no longer real-
istic in our complex modern society to expect each individual to have ade-
quate knowledge of every kind of risk let alone how to address them. How 
do households deal with this apparent lack of decision-making capabilities? Reliance 
on tradition, family advice, and the opinions of experts, often intermediar-
ies with their own interests to serve, is frequently the chosen way out. In-
dividual households get their information from dealing directly with profes-
sionals; but, more importantly, their perceptions are twisted by the popular 
media. However, the impact on individual risk perception is two fold. The 
discourse between the different agents – communicated by the press, induc-
ing government to alter institutions – influences not only the awareness and 
understanding of the risks involved for individuals64 but reaching to them the 
64 Nevertheless, the knowledge of risks involved remains imperfect (see discussion in Elsinga et al., 2007).
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optimal solution as well. I.e. this channel of communication is used – some 
will say misused – by different stakeholders to promote public or private solu-
tions to these risks (e.g. mortgage types, insurances etc.). The outcome of this 
process implies that households will show rational behaviour although their 
stated awareness and perceptions are far from perfect.
 6.3 Implications
The results of the analysis show that, despite large differences in mortgage 
take-up, households across Europe are mainly risk-averse. Given the differ-
ences in the institutional context, the characteristics of both households and 
mortgage contracts, the costs and risks (consequences) of the same mortgage 
(type and amount) vary across countries. Hence, the optimal mortgage will 
not be identical in each country. One obvious policy-question arise from these 
results: if mortgage take-up translates differently in terms of costs and risks on a mi-
cro level, what does this imply on a more aggregated level?
Earlier, I mentioned that financial authorities across Europe are worried 
about the risks of high mortgage take-up not only for individual households 
but also for the financial sector and national governments. Their concerns 
stem primarily from the recent huge increase in mortgage take-up, resulting 
in high outstanding mortgage debts as a percentage of GDP. This data is repli-
cated in Figure 6.1. It is clear that mortgage take-up in Denmark, the Nether-
lands and the UK is considerably higher than elsewhere65. However, how does 
this relate to the risks? Figure 6.1 presents as well, the cost-and-risk equiva-
lent of the outstanding mortgage debt. These latter figures are calculated by 
estimating the costs and risks of the (mix of) mortgage types chosen by bor-
rowers in a particular country and divided by the net household income of 
borrowers66 (see Chapter 4 for more details). The final result, i.e. the cost-and-
risk equivalent, is the weighted average of costs and risks of non-movers, re-
cent buyers and first-time buyers.
It is obvious from Figure 6.1 that the cost-and-risk equivalent of outstand-
ing mortgage debt grasps a different picture. The cost-and-risk equivalent for 
France and Italy is considerably higher, closing in on Denmark and the Neth-
erlands and surpassing the UK with Belgium still trailing behind. This result 
stems from three factors. First, given the typical mortgage choice and the ‘ba-
sic’ system of housing provision in these countries, the costs and risks of a 
65 The data shown is from 2003; meanwhile in 2006 the gap between high and low lending countries has in-
creased (Italy 13% cf. the Netherlands 111% of GDP).
66 Taking into account households characteristics of the borrowers, the institutional context, and, of course, the 
exact amount borrowers has taken out.
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mortgage are higher in France (24%) and Italy (14%) than in the Netherlands (= 
benchmark). Next, the net household income of borrowers in these countries 
is lower than in the Netherlands. Finally, there is a difference in the number of 
households (borrowers) that are obliged to pay for the outstanding mortgage.
Of course, a rise in mortgage take-up increases the risks for individuals, 
the financial sector and society in all countries, but the translation of mort-
gage debt to the cost-and-risk equivalent is not identical across Europe. Any 
increase in countries like France and Italy would constitute more risks than 
elsewhere, not least because the institutional context in the former countries 
is not geared to high mortgage take-up (e.g. repossession procedure, financial 
support for households in distress) while the repayment discipline of borrow-
ers is less persistent (see, for instance, the high level of arrears).
The recent, rapid increase in outstanding mortgage debt in countries like 
France and Italy is creating greater risks there, than in Northwest Europe, i.e. 
the financial system in the Netherlands and the UK is more robust and ef-
ficient than elsewhere. Therefore, the focus of the debate on the risk of mort-
gages should be shifted southwards67.
67 Though a comparison of the US and Europe was beyond the scope of this thesis, the results do show that 
risks for individual households and the economy can not be captured by some simple macro indicators alone. 
High-ranking countries based on loan-to-value and/or loan-to-income ratios (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands) 
have low comparable cost-risk equivalents than other countries. Hence, worries about European housing and 
mortgage markets based on a comparison of e.g. loan-to-value ratios across the Atlantic are misleading.
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 6.4 Recommendations for further research
The results of this thesis and the discussion earlier in this chapter suggest 
some interesting lines of research. I shall elaborate on three of them in more 
detail:
Risk mitigation on mortgage markets: the role of institutions.1.  Under pressure 
of for instance the ongoing globalisation, the traditional triangle of home-
ownership, labour markets and social security is redefined. This will obvi-
ously lead to a different risk distribution between the financial sector, the 
state and households. In this process, (prospective) individual homeowners 
seem to be loosing ground. Therefore, there seems to be a growing need to 
invent new institutions that can mitigate the risk for individual homeown-
ers. These new institutions are not synonymous with new forms of state 
intervention; the market can help by introducing new mortgage and/or in-
surance products.
Nowadays, different solutions are being introduced (or discussed) across 
Europe, consisting of new forms of state provision, improved consumer 
rights etcetera. This thesis showed the impact of institutions on the costs 
and risks of mortgages. However, the analysis also showed that what works 
well in one country is not necessarily the best solution for another. We 
therefore need to extend our knowledge on the relationship between insti-
tutions and mortgage risks and risk distribution.
Policymakers and private actors will then have better insights on how 
to alter the existing set of institutions to cope with the rapidly changing 
environment and (prospective) homeowners will remain more at ease with 
their housing situation and financial commitments.
The impact of institutions on shaping supply and demand.2.  Mortgage markets 
have grown rapidly in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Recent growth has 
brought the outstanding mortgage debt to a staggering €5.1 trillion (EMF, 
2005), i.e. over 40% of all outstanding bank credits and equal to more than 
one third of the joint GDP. Mortgage markets are a matter of growing con-
cern for financial authorities (economic instability) and policymakers (con-
sumer protection), sparking all kinds of regulatory changes. The lenders’ 
environment is changing continuously and at an accelerating pace.
However, the response to the demands of regulatory bodies can conflict 
with customer orientation. This is an unwelcome trend, certainly in times 
when we put more trust on the market to find housing solutions for citi-
zens. The role of institutions and policies in shaping the demand for mort-
gages has been well-researched, institutional change will alter the optimal 
mortgage choices for individual households and increased competition 
will force lenders to fill in any gaps swiftly. The influence, however, that in-
stitutions and government policy have on firm-level behaviour (i.e. product 
development) and performance (i.e. costs) is, yet, uncharted territory, but it 
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is obvious that such relationships do exist.
Development of tools to assist households in making more informed choices about 3. 
their mortgages. Now and in the near future, mortgage decisions will remain 
the most important financial decision that a household will make. How-
ever, while society demands more responsibility from homeowners and 
the financial sector is more than happy to supply solutions, homeowners 
are stuck with a growing choice of mortgage products without knowing 
the exact implications and risks. There is a pressing need for tools to as-
sist households to make a (more) informed choice. Households do behave 
rationally and will do so in the future; but the lack of knowledge and the 
limited learning capabilities of the ‘average’ household contradict with the 
more complex mortgage products on offer now and in the future. I.e. their 
pursuit for rationality is reaching its borders. Here, a more multidiscipli-
nary approach is needed with economists saying what and psychologists 
saying how to tell (prospective) homeowners about the risks of different 
mortgage options.
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 Appendix A Estimation of the interest 
and income model
A. Estimation of the interest model
Here I followed the approach suggested by Chen et al. (1995). Recall,
(1) dr t = λ (µ−rt )dt+σ√r t−1  dX
Recall that λ is the speed of adjustment of the actual interest r t to the long-
term mean µ , and σ√r t−1 is the implied volatility. The values of are drt nor-
mally distributed (Cox et al., 1985) with a mean and variance of:
E [r t|r0]  = r t e−λt + µ(1−e−λt)
V [r t|r0]  = r t σ
2
λ
[e−λt−e−2λt]+µ σ
2
λ
[1−e−2λt]
Note that the variance is a function of the dependent variable r t, i.e. it is time-
dependent. This automatically leads to a more complicated estimation proce-
dure for the different variables. A weighted least square regression analysis 
is necessary (Judge et al., 1982). First, a simple regression model can be esti-
mated:
r t = β0r t−1+β1+ξ t
β0 = e−λt ∧  β1 = µ(1−e λt ) 
Here, the error term ξ t is no longer identically and independently distribut-
ed (since it depends on time); therefore, ordinary least squares do not apply. 
With the variance structure specified above, however, we can see this as a re-
gression model with heteroskedasticity. Therefore, since the variance of the 
error term is equal to
E[ξ t
2]  = r t 
σ2
λ
[e−λt−e−2λt]+µ σ
2
λ
[1−e−2λt]
a second regression model may be estimated:
ξ t
2 = ω0r t−1+ω1+st
ω0 = 
σ2
λ
[e−λt−e−2λt]  ∧  ω1 = µ
σ2
λ
[1−e−2λt]
The results of the first regression model can be used for solving λ and µ , and 
the results of the second for σ. The results are shown in Table A.1.
The data used consist of monthly data from 1990:1 to 2004:12. For the euro-
countries, the 1-month AIBOR/EURIBOR interest rate was used; for Denmark 
and the UK respectively the 3-months deposit rate, DKK and the end month 
sterling Interbank lending rate, mean LIBID/LIBOR.
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B. Estimation of the income model
Here, I follow closely the approach suggested by Dutta et al. (1997). Recall:
(2)
  Prob. θ	 dyt = µdt + σdX2 
 Prob. (1−θ )  dyt = 
~yt /y t−1
in which the new household income ~yt is drawn from the distribution 
N( ~µt, 
~σ t  ) with 
~µt and  
~σ t as the mean and variance of the recurrent distribu-
tion. So, what we need is to estimate the model Γ  = (µ , σ , θ , ~µ , ~σ). The income 
in any year is the outcome of a dynamic process in which the household in-
come changes from year to year depending on the economic cycle and eco-
nomic events and demographic transformations.
The mean and variance of the income in year t+1 , conditional on house-
hold income in year t, are:
M (yt+1|yt )  = θ (µ+yt )+(1−θ )~µ
V (yt+1|yt )  = θσ2+(1−θ )~σ2+θ (1−θ ) (y t+µ−~µ)2
in which yt  = log(y) . The parameters Γ  = (µ , σ , θ , 
~µ , ~σ) can be estimated by 
maximising the conditional likelihood:
L(yt,Γ )  = 
N
∑
i=1
l t (y t,Γ )  = lnφ  
y t+1 − M(yt+1|y t )
√V(yt+1 |y t )
  −
1
2
ln (V(yt+1|yt ))
in which φ	[ . ]  is the standard normal density function.
In the original study by Dutta et al., different alternatives for θ were as-
sessed. Besides the linear variant presented above, θ was estimated  as a 
function of income and/or for different subgroups depending on age and/or 
education. Here, I experimented with different specifications for θ. For most 
countries, a breakdown of θ	into two income groups – θh and θ l – proved most 
appropriate. Therefore, the final estimated model was Γ ’  = (µ , σ , θh , θ l , 
~µ , ~σ). 
Dutta et al. (2001) constructed their model based on the personal income of 
the head of the household. This study, however, accords prime importance to 
the household income as such and not to the income of individual members. 
The model considers this by including the income of all the household mem-
bers with the age of 18+. Note that net income is more volatile at the house-
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Table A.1 Estimation of the interest model: the results
Belgium Denmark France Italy Netherlands UK
Mean-reversion level µ 0.0390 0.0440 . . . 0.0450
Implied volatility σ√r t −1 0.0410 0.0330 . . . 0.0460
Reversion speed λ 0.2395 0.2801 . . . 0.3834
Spread (av.) 0.0100 0.0070 0.0050 0.0150 0.0040 0.0110
Market price of risk -0.0358 0.0217 . . . 0.0255
The market price of risk was estimated by comparing yield-curves in January 2004 and minimising the sum of squares 
difference of the estimated and actual yield-curves.
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hold level than at the individual level due to, amongst others, demographic 
factors (e.g. divorce).
Finally, the estimation was performed with the ECHP panel dataset for the pe-
riod 1995-2001. The results are shown in Table A.2.
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Table A.2 Estimation of the income model: the results
Belgium Denmark France
Coefficients
Kappa (low income group) 0.8960 0.8550 0.8650
Kappa (high income group) 0.6470 0.4650 0.6340
Mean (non-mover) 0.0160 0.0050 0.0238
Implied volatility (non-mover) 0.0453 0.0395 0.0280
Mean (mover, log) 10.3780 10.6270 10.3510
Volatility (mover, log) 0.0690 0.0550 0.1970
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
Mean 10.25 10.25 10.51 10.51 10.25 10.25
Standard deviation 0.33 0.39 0.27 0.35 0.32 0.40
N 3,406 3,655 5,967
R2 0.757 0.727 0.753
Italy Netherlands UK
Coefficients
Kappa (low income group) 0.9030 0.7310 0.8380
Kappa (high income group) 0.7890 0.5370 0.6210
Mean (non-mover) 0.0177 0.0146 0.0103
Implied volatility (non-mover) 0.0222 0.0198 0.0155
Mean (mover, log) 10.0280 10.2990 10.3120
Volatility (mover, log) 0.2010 0.0870 0.2650
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
Mean 9.93 9.92 10.24 10.24 10.11 10.11
Standard deviation 0.36 0.42 0.16 0.29 0.41 0.51
N 6,157 8,688 6,428
R2 0.781 0.574 0.714
The results show that the model captures the underlying income changes rather well. Since the standard deviation is for 
all countries lower than in the observed series, income uncertainties seem to be underestimated. The model fit for the 
Netherlands is relatively poor; i.e. 43% of the yearly income changes are not accounted for in the model.
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 Appendix B Optimal mortgage choices 
under different conditions
In section 5.3 the costs and risks are evaluated of different mortgage types 
in different countries given the differences in the underlying institutions and 
characteristics of homeowners. This appendix presents a partial analysis of 
different features of both, showing how the different conditions interfere with 
optimal mortgage choices. The partial analysis covers six different scenarios:
The baseline scenario1. 
A scenario in which the mortgage interest tax relief system is abolished2. 
A scenario in which repossession time is extended3. 
A structural increase in inflation4. 
A structural increase in real interest rates5. 
Finally, a scenario presenting optimal choices for low-income households.6. 
The calculations of all six scenarios are based on the paradigmatic case rep-
resenting the recent buyers in the Netherlands. The same analysis could be 
performed mutatis mutandis for other countries. Given the differences in the 
baseline scenarios, the outcomes would be different, but the direction of the 
shift in the optimal mortgage choice would be the same (e.g. with a system-
atic increase in inflation, long-term mortgages with variable interest rates are 
more beneficial).
The costs and risks of different mortgage types68 are (re)calculated under 
the above-mentioned six scenarios. For each different scenario, the optimal 
mortgage in terms of lowest costs, lowest risks are presented in Table B.1.
A detailed discussion of the various outcomes is not required here. How-
ever, it is worth noting that the results show significant differences in the op-
timal mortgage choice under different conditions. Implicating those house-
holds concerned should alter their mortgage choice when conditions changes 
for the reason that their present mortgage renders suboptimal. By adjusting 
their mortgage choice, borrowers may save money and/or reduce risk. To give 
one example: an abolishment of the much debated mortgage interest rate fa-
cility in the Netherlands will lead to an initial rise in costs of €69,433. On the 
other hand, changing the mortgage choice towards the new optimum (see Ta-
ble B.1) will lead to a decrease in expected cost of ~€26,000; hence, just by ad-
justing mortgage choices households could save 38.6% of the initial increase 
following an abolishment of the mortgage interest tax relief system (Neute-
boom, 2008).
Overall, the results show that the optimal mortgage choice (mix) for indi-
vidual homeowners changes for the different scenarios. On a more aggregate 
level it shows, once again, that differences in mortgage take-up (outcomes) 
across countries do not necessarily imply a fundamental difference in the 
underlying household decision making process. That is, if changes in institu-
68 See the set of mortgage types defined and shown in Table 5.1.
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tions and/or economic conditions occur, the optimal mortgage shifts. Hence, 
in a cross-country analysis in which by definition both economic conditions 
and institutions differ – not withstanding growing European cooperation – the 
optimal mortgage differs accordingly.
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Table B.1 Optimal mortgage choices under different conditions (recent buyers in the Netherlands, 2003)
Institutional changes Economic conditions
Base scenario
Mortgage 
Interest Tax 
Relief abolished
Repossession 
Period extended 
½y → 5y
Structural 
increase in 
Inflation +1%
Structural 
increase in 
Interest +1%
Household with 
lower income
Lowest 
risks
Interest-only 
mortgages with 
short duration 
and variable 
interest rates
Serial 
mortgages, 20-
year duration, 
fixed interest 
rate period
Interest-only 
mortgages, 20-
year duration 
with variable 
interest rate
Serial mortgage, 
20-year duration 
and 10 years with 
variable or fixed 
interest rates, 
closely followed 
by interest-only 
mortgages
Serial 
mortgage with 
short duration 
and fixed 
interest rate
Savings mortgage, 
30-year duration 
with variable 
interest rate
Lowest 
costs
Savings 
mortgages, 30-
year duration, 10 
years to variable 
interest rates
Investment 
mortgages, 20-
year duration, 
10 years fixed, 
closely followed 
by serial 
mortgages
Serial mortgage 
with fixed 
interest rates 
and long 
duration
Long duration, 
especially 
interest-only 
mortgage with 
variable interest 
rate
Savings 
mortgage 
with 30-year 
duration 
and variable 
interest rate
Serial loan, 30-
year duration, 10 
years fixed, closely 
followed by a 
savings mortgage 
with long duration 
and fixed interest 
rate
This table shows the optimal mortgage choice a homeowner should opt for, if acting rational. The abbreviations in each 
cell corresponds to mortgage type, fixed interest period and total duration (see the different assessment categories in 
Table 5.1).
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  Over rationeel gedrag  
van leners 
Een vergelijking van de risico-
attitude van eigenaar-bewoners
By Peter Neuteboom
Summary (in Dutch)
Eigenwoningbezit mag zich in Nederland en daarbuiten verheugen in een 
grote, en groeiende, populariteit. Omdat het merendeel van de(ze) eigenaar-
bewoners niet in staat is de aankoop van een eigen huis geheel uit eigen mid-
delen te financieren, betekent deze trend eveneens dat het hypotheekbezit69 
onder eigenaar-bewoners de afgelopen jaren sterk is gegroeid. Momenteel 
bedraagt de uitstaande hypotheekschuld in Europa €5,1 biljoen (EU15, 2005), 
dat wil zeggen meer dan 40% van alle uitstaande bankkredieten en gelijk aan 
ruim een derde van het gezamenlijke bruto binnenlands product. Binnen Eu-
ropa verschilt het hypotheekbezit echter aanmerkelijk, zowel op micro- als 
macroniveau.
Die uitstaande, en groeiende, hypotheekschuld is een toenemende bron 
van zorg voor financiële autoriteiten in binnen- en buitenland; daarbij wordt 
expliciet verondersteld dat de uitstaande schuld een goede indicator is van de 
risico’s die huishoudens, de financiële sector en de economie als geheel lopen. 
Meer impliciet blijft dat de uitstaande hypotheekschuld ook iets zou zeggen 
over de risicohouding (= attitude) van eigenaar-bewoners; dat wil zeggen dat 
een hoge hypotheekschuld ‘suggereert’ dat het betrokken huishouden bereid 
is meer risico’s te lopen.
In dit proefschrift worden beide noties ter discussie gesteld. Risico’s van 
hypotheken zijn immers complex en veelzijdig waarbij veel exogene en endo-
gene factoren van invloed zijn, factoren die ook nog eens sterk tijd- en plaats-
gebonden zijn. Dit noopt tot een zorgvuldige en consistente ‘vertaling’ van 
hypotheekbezit naar kosten en risico’s; noodzakelijk om de werkelijk risico’s 
van hypotheken voor eigenaar-bewoners te kunnen identificeren en vergeli-
jken.
Ten minste drie factoren maken dat hypotheekgebruik door eigenaar-be-
woners niet direct kan worden begrepen als indicator voor de onderliggende 
risico’s, zeker in een internationale vergelijking. Allereerst gaat het hierbij om 
de relevante institutionele context (regelgeving, subsidies, sociale zekerheid, 
arbeidsmarkt etc.). De institutionele context beïnvloedt mede de oorzaken, de 
aard en omvang van de risico’s van hypotheken voor huishoudens. Zo kan bv. 
een goed sociaal vangnet de gevolgen van inkomensonzekerheid/werkloos-
heid voor huishoudens (gedeeltelijk) wegnemen; en betekenen royale fiscale 
randvoorwaarden (o.a. hypotheekrenteaftrek) dat de werkelijk kosten van een 
hypotheek aanmerkelijk kunnen worden teruggedrongen. Daarnaast is het ri-
69 Dit begrip slaat op zowel de omvang van de hypotheekschuld als de (gangbare) financieringsvormen.
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sicoprofiel van (potentiële) eigenaar-bewoners niet gelijk. In het ene land re-
presenteert het landelijke gemiddelde ook een gemiddelde eigenaar-bewoner; 
in andere landen vindt er een uitsortering plaats waardoor de rijkste en/of 
meest kansrijke huishoudens in de eigenwoningsector zitten. Daardoor kun-
nen deze laatste, ondanks een hogere hypotheekschuld toch minder risico’s 
lopen. Ten slotte zijn, ondanks verregaande Europese samenwerking, hypo-
theekmarkten nog steeds primair nationale markten. Met onder meer als ge-
volg dat het palet aan hypotheken waaruit eigenaar-bewoners kunnen kiezen, 
en de risico’s die daarmee samenhangen, uiteenlopen tussen landen.
Dus, hoewel, in termen van hypotheekbezit er onder huishoudens in Eu-
ropa grote verschillen bestaan, kan a priori dus niet worden verondersteld dat 
de verschillen in hypotheekgebruik binnen Europa synoniem zijn met ver-
schillen in risico’s en risicohouding. Verschillen in institutionele context en 
kenmerken van kopers en nationale hypotheekmarkten hebben grote invloed 
op de werkelijke netto kosten en risico’s van het hypotheekbezit.
De rationele keuze theorie veronderstelt dat huishoudens kiezen voor het 
voor hen meest gunstige alternatief (hier: hypotheek). Indien onzekerheid 
bestaat over de risico’s die samenhangen met de verschillende alternatieven, 
hangt de uiteindelijke keuze van huishoudens af van hun individuele risico-
houding. Gegeven het gewicht van de woonuitgaven (hypotheekkosten) bin-
nen het totale beschikbare huishoudbudget mag worden verondersteld dat 
huishoudens overwegend risicomijdend zijn. De centrale hypothesen in dit 
proefschrift weerspiegelen deze verwachting: (I) huishoudens kiezen overwe-
gend rationeel en (II) huishoudens zijn daarbij primair risicomijdend (hoofd-
stuk 1).
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de concepten risico en risicohouding bediscussieerd. 
Risico’s worden in dit verband gedefinieerd als een combinatie van onzeker-
heden, kansen en negatieve consequenties. In het hoofdstuk worden onzeker-
heden – waarmee huishoudens rekening (zouden) moeten houden – verkend 
(zie hiervoor); evenzo de mogelijke negatieve consequenties voor hen (bv. be-
talingsproblemen of gedwongen verkopen). Ten slotte wordt een conceptueel 
model uitgewerkt waarmee de risicohouding van huishoudens kan worden 
gemeten en vergeleken tussen landen.
De overeenkomsten en verschillen in hypotheekgebruik, de institutionele 
context, evenals de karakteristieken van (potentiële) eigenaar-bewoners en 
van nationale hypotheekmarkten worden beschreven en bediscussieerd in 
hoofdstuk 3. De focus ligt hierbij op ontwikkelingen in België, Denemarken, 
Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Deze analyse toont 
aan dat er grote verschillen bestaan tussen de verschillende landen; een een-
duidige rangorde kan echter niet worden vastgesteld, omdat de verschillende 
relevante aspecten te veelzijdig zijn en daardoor niet eenduidig vallen te ver-
gelijken.
De resultaten vormen de noodzakelijke achtergrond voor de interpretatie 
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van de resultaten van deze studie ten aanzien van risico’s en risicohouding.
Om de kosten en risico’s van hypotheken eenduidig in beeld te brengen 
is een simulatiemodel ontwikkeld (hoofdstuk 4). De belangrijkste elementen 
van de relevante institutionele context zijn hierin gemodelleerd, evenals de 
kenmerken van huishoudens en van specifieke hypotheekvormen. Omdat zo-
wel de kenmerken van huishoudens (bv. het inkomen), als de kosten van de 
gekozen hypotheek veranderen in de tijd (door bv. inflatie of rentewijzigingen) 
is een meer dynamische aanpak noodzakelijk, waarbij de totale kosten van de 
hypotheek over een lange periode worden berekend. In het model wordt daar 
rekening mee gehouden door de huizenprijzen, inkomen, rente, inflatie en 
aandelenkoersen als endogene variabelen te beschouwen. Aldus kan het fei-
telijke hypotheekbezit van eigenaar-bewoners worden ‘getransformeerd’ naar 
de werkelijke kosten en risico’s die dit voor hen impliceert.
Het model kan ook worden gebruikt om de risicohouding van huishoudens 
te meten (hoofdstuk 5). Deze risicohouding wordt afgeleid door de gekozen 
hypotheek(vorm) van een eigenaar-bewoner te vergelijken met alle alterna-
tieven die voor hem open staan. Omdat de kosten en risico’s deels afhankelijk 
zijn van individuele omstandigheden en van de relevante institutionele con-
text, is het daarbij wel noodzakelijk dat de vergelijking plaatsvindt op basis 
van een consistente output indicator, dat wil zeggen de kosten en risico die 
aan een dergelijke keuze verbonden zijn.
De resultaten van de analyse worden gepresenteerd en bediscussieerd in 
de hoofdstukken 4 en 5. Op basis van de resultaten gepresenteerd in hoofd-
stuk 4 kan de conclusie worden getrokken dat de kosten en risico’s die aan 
specifieke hypotheekcontracten gekoppeld zijn, sterk verschillen tussen lan-
den. De gemiddelde kosten – over de gehele looptijd van de hypotheek, in 
netto contante waarde – die aan een standaard hypotheek van €100.000 kle-
ven, lopen uiteen van €113.000 in Nederland tot meer dan €147.000 in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk. De risico’s van hypotheken – onzekerheid over de totale 
omvang van de toekomstige betalingen, betalingsproblemen of gedwongen 
verkoop – variëren evenzeer. Hierbij zijn de risico’s slechts gedeeltelijk pro-
portioneel met de omvang van de kosten an sich, deels ook gekoppeld aan de 
hypotheekvorm. Deze resultaten tonen aan dat in een internationale vergelij-
king, simpele indicatoren zoals de uitstaande hypotheekschuld weinig zeggen 
over de daadwerkelijke risico’s voor huishoudens, de financiële sector en/of 
de overheid.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de risicohouding van huishoudens verder geanaly-
seerd. Zoals mocht worden verwacht – op grond van de rationele keuze the-
orie – blijkt uit de analyse dat huishoudens ondanks alles toch ‘uitkomen’ op 
een hypotheek die gegeven hun persoonlijke omstandigheden en de institu-
tionele context waarbinnen zij moeten kiezen (nagenoeg) optimaal is; dat wil 
zeggen dat huishoudens in de onderzochte landen overwegend rationeel kie-
zen. Daarnaast blijken huishoudens in de onderzochte landen overwegend ri-
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sicomijdend te zijn. Dat wil zeggen dat zij opteren voor alternatieven met een 
laag risicoprofiel. Huishoudens in het Verenigd Koninkrijk blijken relatief het 
meest risicozoekend te zijn; hoewel de verschillen substantieel zijn, kiezen 
zij ook niet coûte que coûte voor de hypotheek met de laagste kosten. Ook als 
nader wordt ingezoomd op specifieke groepen – zoals starters, jongeren en la-
ge inkomensgroepen –, verandert het beeld niet wezenlijk. Met andere woor-
den: beide hypothesen worden bevestigd door het onderhavige onderzoek.
Ten slotte, de belangrijkste implicaties van het onderzoek zijn:
Woningmarkten zijn complexe markten, waarbij veel factoren directe en 1. 
indirecte invloed uitoefenen op de markt als geheel en op de positie van 
de verschillende deelnemers. Om dit adequaat te ondervangen, zal in in-
ternationaal vergelijkend onderzoek het accent moeten verschuiven van 
een meer beschrijvende analyse naar het nauwkeurig(er) in beeld brengen 
van de impact van beleid en (economische) condities op de positie van de 
verschillende partijen. Kwantificering is daarbij onontbeerlijk, zoals onder 
meer de resultaten van deze studie hebben aangetoond (voor wat betreft 
de risico’s en risicohouding van kopers).
Financiële autoriteiten, in binnen- en buitenland, zullen moeten investe-2. 
ren in betere indicatoren om (nationale) hypotheekmarkten te monitoren. 
De analyse toont aan dat de risico’s die samenhangen met het hypotheek-
bezit – om verschillende redenen – tussen landen sterk uiteenlopen. Gevolg 
is dat de grote aandacht voor landen met hoge uitstaande hypotheekschul-
den (bv. Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) niet in verhouding staat tot 
de risico’s die deze positie met zich brengt voor de financiële markten. En 
omgekeerd, in landen met een lage uitstaande schuld (bv. Italië) zijn de ri-
sico’s voor individuele eigenaar-bewoners en de financiële sector veel gro-
ter dan op grond van de relatieve omvang van de hypotheekschuld mag 
worden verwacht.
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